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ABSTRACT
URBAN RENEWAL AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILWAUKEE’S AFRICAN
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This thesis examines the impact of urban renewal on the development of
Milwaukee’s African American community, with a particular focus on the 1960s and
1970s. While urban renewal programs of various stripes were promoted as a means of
stoking economic development, these programs had a particularly negative impact on
African American communities throughout the United States in the post-World War II
era. Urban renewal resulted in the wholesale destruction of black neighborhoods, wiping
away important areas of residential, economic and cultural development.
This case study of developments regarding urban renewal and its relation to the
African American community in Milwaukee will provide historians with a deeper and
more complex understanding of the black experience regarding urban renewal programs
and the role that black agency played in that process. It will provide a better
understanding of the ways in which African American neighborhoods were shaped in the
1960s and 1970s and how this process helped integrate key figures into local political
infrastructures through their involvement in urban renewal projects.
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Introduction
This thesis will examine the impact of urban renewal on the development of
Milwaukee’s African American community, with a particular focus on the 1960s and
1970s. While urban renewal programs of various stripes were promoted as a means of
stoking economic development, these programs had a particularly negative impact on
African American communities throughout the United States in the post-World War II
era. Urban renewal resulted in the wholesale destruction of black neighborhoods, wiping
away important areas of residential, economic and cultural development. This process
repeated itself in cities as diverse as Charlotte, NC, Miami, Detroit, and Milwaukee.
While it is difficult to locate hard evidence that it was the intention of city planners to
deliberately disrupt these neighborhoods based on racial animus, it is clear from
developments that they never intended to make whole the black communities disrupted
by their urban renewal projects.
While blacks were more often than not the victims of urban renewal projects their
impact did not represent entirely passive outcomes for African Americans, especially in
Milwaukee. Black agency in the Cream City was instrumental in shaping and
implementing urban renewal projects which helped to shift the focus away from
government-sponsored destruction and moving efforts toward African American-engaged
preservation. African Americans in Milwaukee became active in the urban renewal
process, working to utilize federal funds to develop and maintain economically and
culturally vibrant urban communities. Important local figures from multiple black
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communities became involved in the urban renewal process and remained politically
engaged afterward, utilizing their growing clout to funnel resources to their constituents.1
Urban renewal projects of the 1960s were beginning to reshape urban African
American communities at the very same moment that the Civil Rights movement was at
its peak. The involvement of African Americans in the urban renewal process and their
attempts to shape programs is itself a manifestation of the Civil Rights and Black Power
movements. There would have been no Great Society initiatives pushing for “maximum
feasible participation” without a powerful national freedom struggle led and organized by
African American which drew attention to persistent and growing problem of urban
poverty. Additionally there would not have been the development of neighborhoods like
Milwaukee’s Harambee without the vibrant national discourse about black cultural pride
and aesthetics and a push back against white standards in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
This case study of developments regarding urban renewal and its relation to the
African American community in Milwaukee will provide historians with a deeper and
more complex understanding of the black experience regarding urban renewal programs
and the role that black agency played in that process. It will provide a better
understanding of the ways in which African American neighborhoods were shaped in the
1960s and 1970s and how this process helped integrate key figures into local political
infrastructures through their involvement in urban renewal projects.
1

For secondary sources on the Civil Rights movement in Milwaukee and the development of
black civic engagement during this time period see Patrick D. Jones, The Selma of the North:
Civil Rights Insurgency in Milwaukee (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Bill
Dahlk, Against the Wind: African Americans and the Schools in Milwaukee, 1963-2002
(Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2010); and Jack Dougherty, More than One
Struggle: The Evolution of Black School Reform in Milwaukee (Chapel Hill, NC: University of
North Carolina Press, 2004).
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Although the processes examined in this thesis were repeated in urban centers
large and small throughout the United States Milwaukee provides a unique example.
Unlike Chicago, Detroit, New York City and other metropolitan regions Milwaukee did
not have a large long established black community with a significant middle class that
was able to express significant political power or economic influence. The black
population was quite small when urban renewal began and grew quite rapidly through the
1960s and 1970s. Through the end of the 20th century there was a continuous migration
of blacks to the city not only from the South but increasingly from Chicago through the
1980s and 2000s.
The first chapter will examine the development and implementation of urban
renewal projects in the city of Milwaukee and the varieties of responses that emerged out
of the African American community as a response to these disruptions. The deepening of
black civic engagement was one important result of urban renewal in the city; local
leaders such as Reuben Harpole became embedded in the social and political networks
which provided sustenance for the development of a black middle class and access to the
necessary political apparatus.
The second chapter will examine the construction of Highway 43 as particularly
egregious example of urban renewal. This chapter is an attempt at getting at the
experience of the displaced and understanding the human impact of urban infrastructure
that is often taken for granted. The construction of Highway 43 is an important moment
of disturbance in the development of Milwaukee’s African American community. The
established center of African American culture and life, Bronzeville, was upturned and
people were forced away from this traditional center of black settlement in the city. This
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pushed black residents out into adjacent neighborhoods hastening the transformation of
the Garfield Park neighborhood– once a nearly all German-derived immigrant
community – to the nearly all black Harambee neighborhood.
The final chapter will examine the attempt by African Americans to organize
urban renewal efforts to create a self-sufficient and vibrant black community in
Milwaukee’s Harambee neighborhood. Harambee is the quintessential example of
African Americans in Milwaukee trying to shape and implement a comprehensive urban
renewal project. Industrial employment began to fade away in the 1960s and 1970s at the
moment that blacks were finally winning improved access to good paying blue collar
jobs. African Americans attempted to use Great Society initiatives and anti-poverty
programs to alleviate developing social and economic problems in often discreet ways.
Harambee is one of the most visible and instructive instances of engagement to those
interested in the history of African American community development.
The author would be remiss not to mention the social and political context in
which this thesis was produced. In many ways social and economic conditions are much
worse for the mass of African Americans in the city of Milwaukee and indeed in the
United States than in the period under consideration. Indices concerning poverty,
employment, and health amongst African Americans in the city are at levels which may
well shock a person living in the 1960s or 1970s. The employment rate for black men in
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the city between the ages of 16 and 64 in 2010 was only 44.7 percent, down from 73.4
percent in 1970.2
Racial inequality remains a persistent problem in Milwaukee and Wisconsin,
hindering social advancement for a great number of people in the city and the state. The
infant mortality rate for African Americans in the city between 2005 and 2008 was 15.6
for every 1,000 births, compared to 6.4 for whites.3 A report published by The Annie E.
Casey foundation in 2014 found that Wisconsin had some of the highest social, economic
and educational disparities between black and white children.4
Among the many problems that have emerged in the last three decades, foremost
amongst them is the mass incarceration of black men. The U.S. Census Bureau found that
12.8 percent of working age black men in the state of Wisconsin were behind bars in
2010, nearly twice the national average. The situation was worse for African American
men in Milwaukee County where more than half of black men in their 30s had been
incarcerated at some point in their life, and the same for half of black men in their 40s.5
Our society cannot begin to address these criminal social conditions without
developing a clear understanding of how they developed, what has been tried to reverse
2

Levine, Marc. Race and Male Employment in the Wake of the Great Recession: Black Male
Employment Rates in Milwaukee And the Nation’s Largest Metro Areas 2010, (University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center for Economic Development, 2012),
http://www4.uwm.edu/ced/publications/black-employment_2012.pdf, 6.
3
“For Milwaukee’s Children an Early Grave,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,
http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/114430774.html, Accessed April 16, 2014.
4
Race for Results: Building a Path to Opportunity for All Children, Policy report Kids Count,
(The Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2014),
http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/Initiatives/KIDS%20COUNT/R/RaceforResults/RaceforResul
ts.pdf, 12.
5
John Pawasarat and Lois M. Quinn, Wisconsin’s Mass Incarceration of African American
Males: Workforce Challenges for 2013, (Employment and Training Institute University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013), https://www4.uwm.edu/eti/2013/BlackImprisonment.pdf, 2.
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the trends, and what if anything has been effective. The author hopes that the lessons
drawn by this brief historical review of one small corner of our world will inform
contemporary efforts to attack social and economic inequality everywhere.

Chapter 1
A Review of Urban Renewal in Milwaukee

Introduction
This chapter will provide a review of the forms which urban renewal took in
Milwaukee in the post-World War II era from 1949 to 1996 and the ways that it drove
responses by African American community organizations in the city. Urban renewal was
a phase of urban development common to all large urban areas in the United States in the
immediate post-WWII-era. It took on a myriad of forms including the demolition and
reconstruction of neighborhoods, construction of freeways, civic centers, government
buildings, university expansion, as well as public housing units. The ways in which funds
were distributed at the federal and municipal level changed over time, influencing how
funds were utilized. By the late/mid-Sixties an emphasis on Maximum Feasible
Participation in Great Society initiatives spurred the development of community based
organizations that worked to organize redevelopment programs aimed at the revitalization
and maintenance of existing neighborhoods rather than the razing and reconstruction of
neighborhoods common to previous practices of urban renewal.
Unlike Chicago, Detroit, New York City and other large urban centers Milwaukee
did not have a large black community with a significant middle class who could exercise
significant political clout in the immediate post-World War II period. Urban renewal
disrupted and influenced the development of Milwaukee’s African American
communities in very significant ways while the community was still in its infancy. In
fact, the African American community was still quite small when urban renewal began
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and grew quite rapidly through the 1960s and 1970s. Throughout this period, the heyday
of urban renewal, the city experienced a continued influx of blacks not only from the
South but increasingly from Chicago as well.
Discussions of urban renewal and its history can evoke feelings of anger, and
strong cynicism. The pejorative phrase “negro removal” is often invoked by members of
Milwaukee’s African American community, and by blacks in other cities. There is a
notion that urban renewal was not meant to assist African Americans who lived in
blighted neighborhoods, but was rather to remove them from urban spaces located near
what city officials hoped would be soon-to-be blossoming downtown districts. There is
much more truth to this than many in the political establishment would like to admit.
New housing units were being constructed by urban renewal programs but more
homes were destroyed by urban renewal than were ever rebuilt. In Milwaukee, for
example, between 1966 and 1971 the area which would be covered by the Model Cities
program saw a net loss of 3371 housing units.1 Thousands of people, many impoverished,
were displaced by federal programs over the years. The displacement process was not
limited to urban renewal efforts but included the construction of Highway 43.2
Throughout all of Milwaukee’s attempts at urban renewal and redevelopment African
Americans have been disproportionately impacted.
This chapter will not examine in great detail the economic distress suffered by
many in Milwaukee’s African American community, especially in the so called Inner

1

Elam E. McElroy, Social Indicators for the Milwaukee Model Cities area: 1967 to Present
(Citizens' Governmental Research Bureau, 1972), 100.
2
For a detailed study of displacement in Milwaukee due to highway construction see Patricia
House’s Families Displaced by Expressway Development: A Geographical Study of Relocation In
Milwaukee. House gives a very detailed account of who was displaced, where they moved, and
how satisfied they were with federal assistance in relocation.
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City. The grim economic and social situation for a significant number of African
Americans in the city of Milwaukee in the present moment has deep roots in the 1960s
and 1970s. Numerous studies by UW-Milwaukee’s Center for Economic Development
attest to this fact.3
Rather this chapter will highlight the impact that urban renewal had on the
establishment and development neighborhood organizations, how African Americans in
Milwaukee attempted to influence the urban renewal process, and how in the process of
enacting various urban renewal programs and policies the state and federal government
served to bring the community closer together.
Despite the deleterious impact of urban renewal on Milwaukee’s African
American community, the story is not just about neighborhood destruction or the
oppression of African Americans. Urban renewal was not only the wholesale destruction
of neighborhoods, and the displacement of people; it involved the preservation of homes
and neighborhoods, the development of neighborhood organizations, and it spurred
community engagement in the redevelopment process. Urban renewal also prompted the
creation of citizen run home improvement organizations and construction companies that
were owned, managed, and staffed by local African Americans. The development of a
clear understanding of the impact of urban renewal projects on Africans Americans
demands an examination of the historical realities of black agency.
Despite destroying or changing the physical make up of neighborhoods of
historically black neighborhoods, urban renewal programs played a significant part in
encouraging the development of a politically and economically cohesive African
3

UW Milwaukee Center for Economic Development, http://www4.uwm.edu/ced/index.cfm,
Accessed on May 11th 2010.
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American community in Milwaukee. While a neighborhood is a physical collection of
buildings and can be destroyed, a community is something much less tangible though
extraordinarily resilient. A community is comprised of not just the people that reside in
these neighborhoods, but their businesses, organizations, clubs, churches, and
associations. Through interaction in these public spheres amongst friends, families, and
business associates a sense of community is developed and people join together to
attempt to overcome whatever social problem presents itself and to shape their
neighborhoods to meet their needs. When people organize themselves they are able to
determine their own destiny and become less vulnerable to the whim of city planners and
government bureaucrats. Urban renewal polices in the 1960s and 1970s, in part,
encouraged members of Milwaukee’s African American community to organize and form
meaningful and lasting connections to local, state and national political infrastructure.

1949-1960: Setting the Base for Federally Supported Urban Renewal
Intensive federally funded and sanctioned urban renewal began in earnest in 1949
with the passage of the US Housing Act of 1949. It was signed into law by President
Harry S. Truman as part of his Fair Deal legislative agenda, which was an attempt at a
post-war expansion of FDR’s New Deal social programs. Title I of the US Housing Act
authorized the distribution of federal aid to major US cities for slum clearance and the
elimination of blight. This plan required that cities create comprehensive plans for
renewal that included both commercial and residential property, and have local
redevelopment plans conform to a general city plan. A study of Milwaukee’s housing
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conditions in 1948 by the city’s Redevelopment Coordinating Committee4 found
significant amounts of blight on Milwaukee’s south side and what would be labeled in the
1960s as the Inner Core, (Milwaukee’s African American neighborhoods of the 1950s
and 1960s). These findings were used to justify urban renewal programs in the
Kilbourntown, Juneautown, and Walkers Point neighborhoods.
In 1954 the government amended the Housing Act of 1949 to included provisions
for redevelopment, rehabilitation, and conservation of neighborhoods. The new Act
continued to place emphasis on the clearance and redevelopment of severely blighted
neighborhoods, though this practice was often ineffective and unpopular. In 1958
Milwaukee created a Redevelopment Authority after the Wisconsin Legislature passed
the Wisconsin Blight Elimination and Slum Clearance Act which encouraged cities to
create public authorities to guide renewal programs. In 1959 Congress approved grants
for comprehensive Community Renewal Programs.

1960-1970: African American Neighborhood Organizations and Urban Renewal
Milwaukee began its Community Renewal Program in 1961. The Department of
City Development, which was also established in 1961, defined urban renewal as “a
process whereby areas of the community are rebuilt or otherwise upgraded in whole or in
part by public and private enterprise.” In 1964 the Department of City Development
produced a report on Milwaukee’s plans and objectives for Community Renewal
Programs until 1970. Under this six year redevelopment plan African American

4

Milwaukee Redevelopment Coordinating Committee, Blight Elimination & Urban
Redevelopment in Milwaukee: Report of the Redevelopment Coordinating Committee
(Milwaukee: The Committee, 1948), 3.
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neighborhoods were classified as Class IV Areas. Class IV Areas were defined as areas
where,
…deterioration and blighting influences have reached the stage where substantial
clearance and redevelopment is necessary. Rehabilitation of buildings is no longer
feasible; community facilities may be inadequate or obsolete; overcrowding of
land, mixed land uses, traffic and parking problems, and other environmental
deficiencies are widespread. Redevelopment programs by the city in these areas
will be scheduled as soon as possible. Renewal activities by private redevelopers,
in accordance with the master plan, will be encouraged and assisted in every way
possible.5
These Class IV areas comprised 2.6% of the cities land area, 6.5% of the city’s housing
units, and 33.5% of the cities dilapidated housing.6 A significant amount of the city’s
blighted housing stock was concentrated in a very small part of the city, much of it just to
the North and West of the downtown area. The city planners proposed redevelopment
projects for five African American communities, all deemed to be Category IV, the worst
of the worst. These projects were Carver Park, Highland Park, Twelfth and Vliet, Mt.
Sinai, and Hay Market Square. Projects that were already in progress in 1964 were the
Hillside Neighborhood Redevelopment Project, Marquette Urban Renewal Area, and the
Roosevelt Redevelopment project.
The Hillside Neighborhood Redevelopment Program had displaced 69
individuals, 116 families, and destroyed all 204 buildings located in the area between W.
Walnut Street N. 6th Street, W. Galena St and N. 11th Street by the end of 1963. The
Roosevelt Redevelopment project directly to the north would clear all 60 buildings in the
area between W. Vine St., 6th St. W. Walnut and N. 10th St. and displace 88 families. The
main technique used for renewal in these severely blighted communities was clearance

5

Milwaukee Department of City Development, Milwaukee's Community Renewal Program
Projects and Objectives. (Milwaukee: The Department of City Development, 1964), 15.
6
Ibid., 16.
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and redevelopment; very few buildings were preserved in the cities attempt to eradicate
blight. All of the plans that covered African American neighborhoods called for clearance
and redevelopment, which translated into significant numbers of individuals being
displaced throughout the 1960s.
It took many years to build enough housing units to replace those that were
destroyed in these areas, and even then more housing units were destroyed by urban
renewal in Milwaukee’s African American neighborhoods than were rebuilt. The
clearance approach favored by city officials was unpopular with those residence impacted
by them. In response to these clearance techniques people began to organize to improve
and maintain their neighborhoods. At the federal and municipal level governments began
to reevaluate how they funded and carried out renewal programs in an effort to respond to
citizen’s demands to be involved in the urban renewal process.
In 1963 the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials
(NHRO) passed a resolution that called for the formation of neighborhood associations
that could organize citizens to actively participate in the process of urban renewal in their
neighborhoods. These organizations were formed by citizens in reaction to the blight and
deteriorating conditions they saw developing in their neighborhoods and the threat posed
by urban renewal. These groups also formed to address inter-racial problems, inadequate
police protection, housing code enforcement, juvenile delinquency, lack of recreational
facilities, vandalism, and zoning complaints amongst numerous other issues city dwellers
encountered.7

7

Citizens' Governmental Research Bureau (Wis.). Citizen Participation in Community
Development and Urban Renewal. Milwaukee: The Bureau, 1964, 5.
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In 1964 a report by The Citizen’s Governmental Research Bureau, a Milwaukee
think tank which monitored local politics and public policy issues, identified nine
neighborhood improvement organizations operating in the city of Milwaukee. These nine
were Community Beautification and Stabilization Committee, Inc., the Mid-Town
Neighborhood Association, the Thirteenth Ward Community Council, the Lakeside
Community Council, Action 7 Community Council, the Atkinson-Capitol-Teutonia
Community Council (ACT), Cooperation West Side, the Eighth Ward Conservation
Council, and the Milwaukee Urban League.
Out of these nine, with the leadership of Wesley L. Scott, the Milwaukee Urban
League provided the African American community with the most support during the
1960s. The Milwaukee Urban League was second only to the NAACP in recognition
amongst members of the African American community as a group that was working to
advance the interests and well-being of blacks.8 The Urban League represented the Inner
Core area which held the greatest number and highest concentration of African
Americans in Milwaukee. They divided the area into seven different neighborhoods and
provided staff to each neighborhood to assist in the development of a community
organization and a plan for development and improvement. The leaders of the seven
smaller organizations held meetings to coordinate their actions.
These small community groups also belonged to the North Side Community
Inventory Conference (NCIC), which was an organization of “60 religious, civic,
education, social, professional and other organizations in the city’s north side.”9 The

8

Charles O'Reilly, Willard Downing & S. Pflanczer. The People of the Inner Core-North-A Study
of Milwaukee's Negro Community (University Of Wisconsin, 1965), 167.
9
Citizens' Governmental Research Bureau, Citizen Participation in Community Development and
Urban Renewal. (Milwaukee: Citizens Governmental Research Bureau), 1964.
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Conference was formed in 1959 by the Milwaukee NAACP, the Urban League, and the
Commissions on Community Relations. The NCIC’s main concerns were coordinating
the actions of community organizations, providing information on opportunities in the
community, and relaying information on community needs. The Urban League and the
NCIC sponsored numerous seminars at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and
Marquette University on topics such as “the citizen and social action”, and volunteer
leadership in the community.10 These small community groups served as the embryos for
much larger and more ambitious projects such as the Harambee Redevelopment Project
in the 1970s.
In 1964 the Urban League’s community organizations in the Inner Core had 150
members of which 75 percent were African American and 25 percent white.11 This
reflected the racial composition of the area as some whites remained in increasingly black
areas despite the change in the racial composition of their neighborhoods. The groups
held monthly meetings in churches, schools, libraries, and at the Urban Leagues
headquarters. The Urban League urged members to attending Common Council meetings
to voice their support for urban renewal plans, and to present the views and grievances of
the African American community to the city leadership. They also sponsored
neighborhood clean up and fix up campaigns, in attempts to prevent the types of blight
which prompted urban renewal projects. Though several of the city’s neighborhood
associations included African American neighborhoods, the Urban League was the only
community organization which focused on organizing African American’s in response to
neighborhood blight and urban renewal programs two of the group’s boundaries such as
“Sessions Seek Leaders for Negro Community,” The Milwaukee Journal, October 8, 1964.
Citizens' Governmental Research Bureau, Citizen Participation in Community Development
and Urban Renewal (Milwaukee: Citizens’ Governmental Research Bureau, 1964),124.
10
11
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ACT, and The Thirteenth Ward Community Council overlapped the Inner Core, but did
not consider issues affecting the African American community.12
Alongside the Urban League, community organizations, clubs, churches, and
social groups worked to promote urban renewal, and preservation of communities. The
Northcott Neighborhood House (an anti-poverty organization run by the American
Methodist Church) in coordination with the Urban League performed clean-up activities.
St. Francis of Assisi on N. 4th Street coordinated with the Urban League on various
activities including neighborhood cleanup efforts. The Upper Third Street Commercial
Association was formed to draw attention to the decay of the North Third Street business
district, and to promote its preservation and rehabilitation. They lobbied city officials,
provided bus tours of the area, and in 1963 provided tours of proposed urban renewal
sites.13
Despite the challenges facing their community African Americans were
organizing themselves to battle urban blight and decay. They were encouraged by groups
like the Milwaukee Urban League to organize themselves to build and maintain their
communities. People acted out of concern for their communities, they attended meetings,
organized, educated themselves, and volunteered their time. They worked not only with
other blacks, but also with whites who lived in their neighborhoods, and who were
concerned about the issues faced by Milwaukee’s African American community. They
formed groups to stave off blight and other social ills, but more often than not it was too
much for modest community organizations to contain.

12
13

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Milwaukee’s African American community had been subject to disastrous urban
renewal projects but due to their organization by the late 1960s African Americans
developed increasing influence over the direction of federally funded urban renewal.
Under the Model Cities program initiated in 1970 neighborhood organizations and
individual citizens were given a greater say in the planning and implementation of urban
renewal programs.14

1970-74: The Model Cities Program and WAICO
In 1970 Milwaukee was chosen by the federal government as one of 140 cities
which would be involved in the Model Cities Program which was targeted at addressing
growing social problems in the country’s urban centers. This was an attempt by state and
federal planners to develop an effective and uniform way of implementing their
redevelopment plans. In the face of organized citizen response to past attempts at urban
renewal the Federal Government explicitly stressed the importance of citizen input in the
redevelopment and renewal process through Maximum Feasible Participation.
Community development and involvement would be central to the Model Cities program.
It attempted to stimulate community development especially in the poorest of
neighborhoods, without resorting to the clearance and reconstruction plans that were
relied on in the past.
In 1970 the city of Milwaukee produced their Model Cities First Year Action
plan. This comprehensive urban renewal plan, included provisions for 56 different
programs that covered housing, employment, education, welfare, commercial
14

Milwaukee Office of the Mayor, Application to the Department of Housing and Urban
Development for a Grant to Plan a Comprehensive Model Cities Program, (Milwaukee; Office of
the Mayor, 1968).
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development, protection, health, transportation, and recreation. The designated area for
the Model Cities programs encompassed most of north central Milwaukee. The Model
Cities sites included some of the oldest buildings and highest concentration of people,
which are key factors in the development of blighted and dilapidated housing. Not only
did this area face problems of blight and dilapidated housing, but a shortage of housing
due to previous urban renewal projects, including the construction of Highway 43. This
area had about 90,000 people, of which 40% was African American. While 11% of the
cities total population resided in this area, it had more than 33% of the cities substandard
housing units, and 37% of the cities dilapidated housing unites.15
The Model Cities Plan for improving housing conditions included rehabilitation
loans, new housing subsidies, as well as subsidies for non-profit rehabilitation
corporations, federally directed Project HOME, and support of plans presented by the
Walnut Improvement Council (WAICO), a neighborhood self-help group. WAICO’s
objective was to organize the citizens living in the Walnut street area in a concerted effort
to eliminate blight in their neighborhood. The organization reported over 250 dues paying
members in 1969. The group sought to employ and empower African Americans by
working with minority contractors, and required that local residents be hired to help plan
and construct residential projects.16 The employment of residents and minority
contractors would ideally funnel the wages of those employed back into the
neighborhoods covered under the plan, and bring jobs back to the African American
community.

15

Milwaukee Model Cities Agency, Milwaukee Model Cities Program: First Year Action Plan
(Milwaukee, Wis.: Milwaukee Model Cities Agency, 1970), 1.
16
Ibid., 26-27.

19

The first project proposed in Milwaukee’s Model Cities First Year Action Plan
was the Owner Occupied Rehabilitation Loan Supplement. This program encouraged
home owners to bring their homes up to code by providing grants to supplement home
improvement loans. The plan was to encourage up to 150 homeowners to take advantage
of the loan supplement. Funds would go directly to the homeowner, and only single
family and duplex homes would be eligible for the funds. To gain access to this grant the
homeowner would have to contact their bank and determine how much they could get in
home improvement loans, and then they would have to contact the Community
Conservation Office to arrange an inspection of their home to determine what work
needed to be done to bring their home up to zoning standards. Then the homeowner
would contract with the Community Conservation Office and agree to have the work
done. The report estimated that they would pay out roughly $150,000 in supplements
aimed at encouraging citizens to improve their homes.
The project known as WAICO #1 called for the production of 100 new homes in
the Walnut Street area bounded by 12th Street on the east, 20th Street on the west Brown
Street on the North, and Galena Street on the South. In 1960 the neighborhood
surrounding the WAICO area was nearly 63% black. As a result of continued inflow of
Southern migrants the areas black population had seen an astounding 1,955% increase in
the neighborhood from 380 black residents in 1950 to 7,809 in 1960.17 Over half of the
housing in the area was deemed either dilapidated of deteriorating, with nearly 93% of all
the housing having been built in 1919 or earlier.18 By 1970 city leaders and planners
agreed that this area was in dire need of direct assistance from the city government. The
17

H. Yuan Tien, Milwaukee Metropolitan Area Fact Book, 1940, 1950, and 1960 (University of
Wisconsin Press, 1962), 184.
18
Ibid.
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WAICO #1 plan provided for the provision of $2,500 per construction site in land write
down subsidies, in order to encourage the construction of 100 new homes in the area. The
homes would be sold to low-income families through the FHA’s 235 loan program. The
city would also promote beautification of alleys, properties, and yards surrounding the
new homes. The program was dedicated to providing employment to inner city
contractors and laborers first before looking for outside contractors. The planners
budgeted $2,401,000 for the acquisition of property, construction of housing, and land
improvements.19
Another project in the area, WAICO #2, called for the construction of a small
park system throughout the area bounded by 17th Street on the East, 20th Street on the
West, Walnut Street on the North and W. Galena Street on the South. It planned for the
abandonment of certain alley ways and streets, and the development of these areas into
playgrounds and parks.20
The final project presented in the First Year Plan was Project HOME. Its stated
goal was to “provide property owners and tenants… with basic knowledge regarding
household management and to develop their individual skills enabling home
improvements and maintenance through the self-help method.”21 It called for the
establishment of a tool loan library, which they hoped would enable residents to repair
their own homes. WAICO officials also hoped to hold classes on home improvement, and
management of home finances. They hoped to establish the first tool lending library in
the Midtown neighborhood, a mostly black neighborhood. This plan laid the base for a
contemporary Tool Loan Center located at 2500 W. Capitol Drive, which loans tools to
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Milwaukee homeowners for an annual fee of $35. It is supported by funds from the
successor to the Model Cities, the Community Block Development Grant program.22
An examination of the housing programs laid out in the First Year Plan indeed
shows that the Model Cities programs were intended to give more assistance to
Milwaukee’s African American community than to the white community. The members
of WAICO hoped to utilize Model Cities funds to encourage the rehabilitation of
decaying neighborhoods, through the creation of new homes, mortgage subsidies, and the
creation of new housing and park space around the Walnut Street area. The plan to turn
the area around Walnut between 17th and 20th Streets into park space never materialized.
The Model Cities program did a better job at facilitating input from residents in the
planning and construction stages of renewal, than previous attempts at urban renewal.
In 1972 the Citizens Governmental Research Bureau of Milwaukee, a local
organization formed in 1913 to monitor social and economic trends in the city, released a
report on the Model Cities area which intended to illustrate how social conditions in the
neighborhoods had changed after two years of the program. It was an attempt to establish
a way of tracking progress within the Model Cities neighborhoods, and to illustrate
problem areas. The Bureau examined social indicators over a five year period starting in
1966, four years prior to the Model Cities program. These indicators were commercial
development, communications, crime, education, employment, fires, health, housing,
income, recreation, transportation, and welfare. They found a general increase in
attendance of playgrounds and community centers between 1967 and the year after
implementation of the Model Cities programs in 1971. There was also a decrease in the
Milwaukee Common Council, “Need the Right Tool for the Job?”
http://www.city.milwaukee.gov/NeedTheRightToolForT16686.htm, Accessed on March 26th
2010.
22
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number of fires in the area, though false alarms increased. That same year witnessed a
significant net increase of housing units in the Model Cities area. All previous years had
seen a significant loss of housing units. The citizen guided process of urban renewal via
the Model Cities program, which promoted not just new housing but preservation of
housing, seemed to be effective in improving key social indicators. In spite of the
progress the program would be phased into a new approach towards urban renewal, the
Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG) which further emphasized local
control of urban renewal projects.23
The cities previous urban renewal projects prior to Model Cities such as
Kilbourntown-3 and Midtown attempted a top down approach, completely clearing all of
a significant portion of target areas in an attempt to recreate neighborhoods as
bureaucrats saw fit. Where Kilbourntown-3 was by some accounts a success in urban
renewal, Midtown was an undeniable failure. The Midtown project destroyed the
neighborhood it was intended to rehabilitate, so much so that “by 1975 only 340 new
units had been built, while 1,700 had been razed.”24
The Model Cities programs focused on parts of the Midtown area in hopes of
rectifying the net destruction of housing units.25 The Model Cities programs took the
bottom up approach, and tried to develop programs and plans residents found more
immediate. It was an attempt to revitalize, and rehabilitate neighborhoods with the
guidance of citizens who knew and appreciated their neighborhood, as opposed to the
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wholesale destruction of homes by often indifferent city planners. In doing this there was
much less resistance from citizens who were much more open to renewal in their
neighborhood, since they were able to be involved in the decision making process.
Opposition to urban renewal often arose out of a lack of citizen involvement in
the process and the displacement of individuals due to the clearance of housing units.
The Model Cities approach to urban renewal empowered community groups like WAICO
to organize and formulate plans for the revitalization as well as giving homeowners
incentives to fix up their homes. Instead of looking for laborers and contractors outside
the community it encouraged the employment of local laborers and contractors. This
initially directed jobs and money to the African American community which had high
levels of unemployment and high levels of poverty. The Model Cities program facilitated
citizen’s desires to control the development of their neighborhoods.

1974- 1996: Community Development Block Grant Program
After four years the Model Cities programs was consolidated with six other
federally funded development programs into the Community Development Block Grant
Program (CDBG). The CDBG program was created under Title I of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974. This Act provided for the distribution of funds for
activities covered under the seven development programs that preceded it. Activities
which were eligible to be funded by the CDBG program included the acquisition of
blighted property, construction of public works, code enforcement in deteriorated areas,
rehabilitation of buildings, removal of architectural barriers to the elderly and
handicapped, and providing public services such job training and health care. It also
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called for federally funded programs to “be carried out in a neighborhood consisting
predominately of persons of low and moderate income and provide services for such
persons; or involve facilities designed for use predominately by persons of low and
moderate income; or involve employment of persons, a majority of whom are persons of
low and moderate income.”26
The Department of City Development released a report in 1977 that called on the
city to develop an urban renewal plan that focused on preservation of existing housing
stock and structures in the city. They found that the need for new housing structures in
Milwaukee was minimal at best. Between 1970 and 1980 the cities population had begun
its slow process of stagnation and eventual decline. The pressing need for new housing
stock which existed in the 1960s eased in the 1970s and 1980s as Milwaukee’s total
population began to decline as an increasing number of whites left the city and factories
began to shutter.
The CDBG program ushered in much more supple form of federally funded urban
renewal and redevelopment in Milwaukee’s African American community, one that took
into account the thoughts and feelings of residents about existing neighborhoods much
more than ever before. The DCD’s report stated quite clearly:
Clearance should not be a major strategy in Milwaukee’s preservation policy—
except where blighted structures or pockets of deterioration are detrimental to
stable, surrounding residence. Definitions of stable and blighted differ, and care
must be taken not to impose rigid planning standards on any neighborhood
42 U.S.C. 5301Community Development Program, and CPD Web Team. “U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development,”
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/rulesandregs/laws/sec5305.cfm#sec530
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without the involvement of neighborhood residents. A 1976 survey of upper third
Street residential community, for example indicated that over 25 percent felt their
neighborhood was a good place to live and 84 percent said that it was not a bad
place to live. Health and safety standards should be strictly enforced, but resident
input is important in determining the viability of an area.27
The report also found that there was enough empty land in the inner city that if it was
necessary to build new housing, there would be no reason to destroy or clear out entire
neighborhoods as had been done in the 1960s. Rather than enforcing a comprehensive
plan, renewal would be engaged on a case by case basis only where it was deemed
absolutely necessary
Numerous community-based organizations (CBO) were developed and funded
under the CDBG program in Milwaukee to meet the new challenge of preservation and
redevelopment. Many of these organizations were managed, operated, and staffed by
African Americans. These African American lead CBO’s spent most of their efforts and
funding in targeting the development, maintenance, and improvement of housing stock as
well as improving social in black neighborhoods. Amongst the major African American
CBO’s were the Social Development Commission, Carpenters Inc., Commandos Inc.,
Harambee Ombudsman Project Inc., Milwaukee United for Better Housing (MUFBH),
and the O.C. White Soul Club. From roughly 1988 to 1997 African American housing
producers received a total of $2,891,000, though funding was sporadic for these groups,
and most of it came between 1988 and 1990. MUFBH was the major African American
operated housing producer in Milwaukee having received a total of $1,752,000 in CDBG
funds. MUFBH received consistent funding from the CDGB program, until funding was
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cut in 1997 due to a controversy over fiscal problems.28 During the time that it was
funded by the CDGB programs (1989-1995) MUFBH constructed 38 housing units in
African American neighborhoods.29 The O.C. White Soul Club worked in housing
rehabilitation, receiving $2,695,000 from the CDBG fund between 1988 and 1995. The
group completed over 130 rehabilitation projects before their funding was cut in 1995.30
Another major beneficiary of the CDGB funds was the Opportunities
Industrialization Center of Greater Milwaukee (OIC-GM). OIC-GM initially engaged in
assisting the impoverished and elderly in weatherizing their homes, and also provided job
training for African Americans. OIC-GM received $6,488,000 in CDGB funds between
1988 and 1997.31 Yearly funding doubled to over $1 million in 1996 when under the
direction of political and business leaders the organization became the primary state
funded organization which targeted the needs of impoverished individuals and families in
Milwaukee’s African American community.32 Other groups that engaged in block grant
funded programs were not directly run by African Americans, but employed a significant
number of blacks. The largest among these groups were ESHAC, the West End
Community Association, and the Sherman Park Redevelopment Association.
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Between 1995 and 1996 CDBG funded housing programs employed over 230
people. Nearly 50 percent of those employed were African American, whites made up
36.5 percent. The other 15 percent were denoted as other. African American run housing
programs employed 27 percent of the CDGB funded workforce. They employed 52
African Americans, nine whites, and one other.33 In 1995 these block grant funded,
African American-run housing programs received 2,955,000 in block grant funding. This
amounted to a little over 25% of the block grant money awarded in that year. This
amount was down from 1990 which saw over 36% of funding go to African American
run programs, and a high of 48% in 1985.34
Between the years of 1974 and 1996, though their share of the funds declined
over time, the CDBG program fed millions of dollars into the African American
community for the express purpose of maintaining and developing black neighborhoods.
Thanks to these funds hundreds of people were employed in maintaining their own
neighborhoods and neighborhoods around the city. Black-owned, managed, and staffed
business were developed to meet the challenges set by local, state, and federal
governments in the production of housing, and the battle against urban decay and blight.
These groups were funded with CDBG funds as long as they could provide the service
they promised, and could do it without financial problems or malfeasance. Citizen run
organizations were able to use state and federal CDBG funds to help out their
neighborhoods where they saw the greatest need. MUFBH built housing, OIC-GM
assisted in weatherization, Commandos Inc. built ramps to make buildings handicap
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accessible, and many other organizations engaged in activities which they hoped would
help sustain their neighborhoods and enhance their community.

Conclusion
It is important to examine how Milwaukee’s African American developed and
remained cohesive during a time of great disruption. Most of the neighborhoods that
African Americans lived in during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were subject to some
form of urban renewal. A much larger and more cohesive community arose out a very
turbulent period in history, where it was subject to repeated attempts at urban renewal.
Throughout the 1960s Milwaukee engaged in urban renewal which resulted in the
wholesale destruction of African American communities. Much of the housing that was
destroyed in African American neighborhoods was never rebuilt, and much of what was
rebuilt was replaced with public housing. In response to this style of urban renewal the
Urban League assisted in the establishment of neighborhood organizations to help
citizens gain control over their neighborhoods. Residents were encouraged to organize
themselves and improve their community to keep themselves from being subjected to
invasive and destructive renewal projects. The leaders in the Urban League encouraged
residents to voice their opinions, and to promote plans they thought would be beneficial
to their community.
In the 1970s the government responded to citizen’s reaction to destructive urban
renewal with the Model Cities Program. Residents of African American neighborhoods
had an official outlet to present their ideas and attempt to get funding for their own
renewal programs. The Model Cities Program was targeted specifically at helping the
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oldest and most impoverished neighborhoods in Milwaukee. This included most of the
African American neighborhoods in the city. Following on the heels of the brief Model
Cities experiment the Community Development Block Grant Program was established in
1974. It initially made an active attempt to fund organizations that were owned and run
by minorities, and that employed minorities or worked in minority neighborhoods.
This hodgepodge of programs may not have been effective at completely
eliminating the visible blight that bureaucrats were so concerned with, but it had the
effect of shaping Milwaukee’s African American neighborhoods into more cohesive
communities better able to sustain their infrastructures through federal assistance with
services, jobs, and political organization.
The story of urban renewal for Milwaukee’s African American community
therefore is one of persistence and resiliency. The Urban League was instrumental in
developing the community, and bringing people together as African American’s were
being displaced and their neighborhoods were being decimated. Over the past sixty years
people have been unwilling to sit back and watch their neighborhoods deteriorate, or be
subject to invasive urban renewal. Wherever and whenever black Milwaukeeans have
perceived a social wrong they have made attempts to eradicate it. They have formed
neighborhood organizations, founded businesses, engaged in the policy planning process,
and worked through their social groups and churches in attempts to improve social
conditions for themselves and their neighbors. Without the funding and guidance of
federal urban renewal legislation and federal monies many of these projects would never
have happened, or would not have been as effective.
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Urban renewal earned its bad image for the destruction it caused, but it would be
unfair to overlook the ways in which various programs funded citizens’ attempts to
preserve their neighborhoods, encouraged the active participation of residents in
determining the destiny of their neighborhoods, and the instances where federally
directed urban renewal was more or less successful at eliminating blight. It is quite clear
that the issue of urban renewal and its impact on the development of Milwaukee’s
African American community remains contentious.
The next chapter will examine one of the most egregious and destructive acts of
urban renewal undertaken by the city of Milwaukee, the construction of Highway 43.
Freeway construction projects had deleterious effects on African American communities
throughout the United States and Milwaukee was no exception. Freeway construction
projects, like other urban renewal projects in post-World War II era, should be seen as
significant moments of disruption in the development of urban African American
communities and the reinforcement of patterns of racial segregation.

Chapter 2
Highway 43, Urban Renewal and the Reinforcement of Racial Segregation
Introduction
This chapter provides a case study of a particular form of urban renewal, freeway
construction, and the impact that it had on Milwaukee’s African American population. As
in numerous urban centers throughout the United States in the post-World War II era
freeway construction was undertaken as a means of easing traffic congestion with the
hopes that this would stave of economic stagnation and decline particularly in the old
industrial cities of the Midwest. These projects had a disparate impact on African
American communities disrupting or destroying important residential, cultural, and
economic centers which had developed out of the Great Migration sparked by the
industrial demands of World Wars One and Two.
Urban centers throughout the country, but particularly in the North and the West,
witnessed an explosion in their African American populations in the Twentieth Century.
Milwaukee is a typical example of one such city. This growth in population also
witnessed the development of residential segregation wherein African Americans were
restricted to the areas of cities which were the least desirable and contained the oldest
housing stock. These restrictions along with a rapid expansion in population contributed
to above average population densities. Due to the tenuous nature of their economic
position, restrictions on housing, and high population densities it often meant that African
Americans lived in neighborhoods that were rapidly decaying.
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What was dreamed up as a key to prosperity for post-war America, and for many
it was, was a nightmare for many African American and working class white
communities. In urban areas as different as Miami, Detroit, Charlotte, NC and Milwaukee
freeway construction destroyed thousands of homes, numerous businesses, and displaced
tens of thousands of individuals. Little attention was given to supporting those that were
displaced, even though they were already the most socially and economically
marginalized groups. The amount of housing units destroyed by freeway construction
through residential neighborhoods outpaced any efforts to build new affordable housing
for inner-city residents. Additionally there was resistance by suburban whites, and those
who lived in affluent white neighborhoods to building new housing stock that might
attract African Americans from the ghettoized portions of American cities.
As the African American population grew in urban areas they quickly became
associated with these ghetto conditions, and many whites feared that if African
Americans moved into their neighborhoods it would lead to a precipitous drop in their
property values. This meant that as African Americans moved into new and better
housing on the fringe of ghetto areas that these neighborhoods rapidly lost their white
population. Every white person with means either moved to another part of the city or
into the rapidly expanding suburbs. When whites fled the city they not only took
themselves and their families, they also took whatever money and wealth they had with
them as well. This historical process is classically known as white flight.
This process of white flight and expanding ghettos provided a dual problem for
cities. By the end of the 1950s urban areas were no longer the economic engines they
once were, but were increasingly spaces of concentrated poverty and extreme racial
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segregation. Racist housing practices extended to the suburbs, via restrictive residential
zoning ordinances and resistance to federally subsidized low income housing. This kept
all African Americans regardless of socio-economic status restricted to increasingly
destitute cities. This made it inevitable that any attempt by cities or the federal
government to address the economic imbalance between city and suburb would
disproportionately impact African Americans.1
In the early 1950s urban planners believed they had discovered the key for urban
economic woes. They utilized federal funds to build interstate highways through the heart
of all major metropolitan areas. They believed that highways would be an economic boon
to central cities; they would send property values back up, and would bring back the
businesses and affluent whites who had fled to suburbs. Highways would serve to funnel
much of the capital that had fled to the suburbs back into the city. To those who pushed
for highways they represented a potential for the rebirth of urban centers. At the same
time freeways could be placed in such a way as to eliminate much of the so called blight
which was tarnishing the image of cities and seemed to be spreading like a contagion.
Freeways could contribute to urban renewal in more way than one.2
In the post-WWII period Milwaukee followed in the footsteps of many urban
municipalities throughout the United States supported by the federal government by
engaging in urban renewal and large scale construction projects. This included the
construction of federally subsidized public housing, slum clearance, and the construction
of the interstate highway system. This was a direct response the economic decline of
Arnold R, Hisrch, “With or Without Jim Crow,” in Urban Policy in 20th century America, ed.
Arnold Hirsch and Raymond A. Mohl (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993), 78-90.
2
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1
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America’s major urban centers, and the explosion of suburban areas. The post-war
economy witnessed the emergence of a large middle class, and the explosion of
automobile ownership. At the same time it witnessed a transition away from war time
industry. The impact of differing municipalities’ efforts on marginalized communities
throughout the country would be remarkably similar.
The African American experience of urban renewal and highway construction
was not unique to Milwaukee. In nearly every city where freeways were built they had a
negative impact on African American neighborhoods.3 The explicit racial character of the
construction of the highway system witnessed the dramatic transformation of the land and
the transition of urban African American communities throughout from the first ghetto of
the early 20th century to the second ghetto of the second half of the 20th century, two very
different places marked by distinct social problems. As black urban populations grew in
the post-World War II period they were pushed and prodded by city planners away from
central areas of cities towards fringe areas, and generally less desirable spaces. Much of
3
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this expansion was guided by white realtors and city planners with the specific intent of
moving black populations and reshaping their neighborhoods in the quest of profit and
higher property values. Throughout the United States “expressways plowed through
black communities, destroying thousands of low-income housing units. The interstate
highway system provided an unparalleled opportunity to clear out inner-city blight and
make room for central business district development.”4
In the first decade of the 21st century the city of Milwaukee saw its demographics
shift with whites comprising the minority population, and African Americans and
Hispanics in the majority. Despite this shift, patterns of racial segregation within the city
persist, and Milwaukeeans are reminded on a yearly basis they live in one of the most
segregated metropolitan areas in the country. These patterns of segregation have deep
roots in Milwaukee’s past. It came about via variety of official and unofficial actions
which restricted African Americans to certain areas, and then directed their movement in
a certain direction.
The construction of Highway 43 was one of the most significant official actions
taken by city leaders which reinforced established patterns of racial segregation in the
city of Milwaukee. City leaders utilized federal funds to build a network of high speed
freeways which they hoped would ease traffic congestion in the city, draw back former
residents who had absconded to the suburbs and spur economic growth in the downtown
area. The North-South route now known as Highway 43 was constructed through the
heart of the city through the area known as Bronzeville, the center black life and
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entertainment in the city, with devastating consequences for many individuals and
families in Milwaukee’s developing African American community.
The construction of Highway 43 is an important moment of disturbance in the
history of Milwaukee’s African American community. The established black
neighborhood of Bronzeville was completely upturned and a large number of people were
forced away from the traditional center of black settlement in the city. This pushed black
residents out into adjacent neighborhoods hastening the transformation of the Garfield
Park neighborhood into Harambee which contributed to the expansion of the areas which
were open to African American in the city, though still restricted to those neighborhoods
on the Northwest side.

The Development of Milwaukee’s African American Community Prior to WWII
At the start of the 20th century the Milwaukee Real Estate Board was determined
to confine Milwaukee’s black population to a single Black Belt as was being done in
other cities such as Chicago. Unofficial policies which were utilized to achieve this goal
included redlining by banks, and racially restrictive covenants enforced by realtors,
homeowners and home owner associations. Additionally gentlemen’s agreements
between relators asserted that they would only sell housing to African Americans in
certain neighborhoods. These were the tools that were utilized in the shaping of
Milwaukee’s first ghetto between 1900 and 1950. Their efforts worked and by 1932 a
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distinct African American neighborhood had emerged between E. North Avenue., State
Street, N. 3rd. Street, and N. 12th Street.5
In comparison to other major metropolitan areas the growth of Milwaukee’s
African American community in the pre-WWII period was quite slow. Milwaukee did
not experience significant expansion in its African American population until well into
the post-war period. In 1940 8,821 African Americans claimed residence in the city of
Milwaukee, a tiny 1.8% of the total population. In 1950 Milwaukee’s black population
totaled 21,772, roughly 3.4% of Milwaukee’s total population. By the end of the decade
in 1960 the total black population stood at 62,458, 8.4% of Milwaukee’s population.
African Americans’ total numbers had nearly tripled in the ten year period between 1950
and 1960, and grown seven times between 1940 and 1960. This dramatic rise in the
African American population, many of them young and poor migrants from the South,
brought increased scrutiny and uncertainty from the white population, the petty bourgeois
black community, and governmental power structures.
Unofficial policies of containment only worked to hold Milwaukee’s black
population for a short period of time. The African American population’s continued and
dramatic growth pushed against the established boundaries. Racially restrictive covenants
and gentlemen’s agreements, due to their voluntary nature, were ineffective tools for
enforcing racial separation. As blacks moved into fringe neighborhoods whites moved
out and the areas where African Americans were allowed to live began a block by block
expansion. City planners turned to enacting strategic zoning laws as a means of ensuring
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that blacks would not move south into the central business district. The southern half of
the African American district was zoned for industrial and light manufacturing
construction in 1920 and it remained as such until World War II. This was effective in
cutting off a Southern route for the growth of the black residential area, keeping African
Americans on the outer fringes of the central business district. It also provided a means
for landlords to squeeze as much money out of a limited housing supply as possible.6
In 1945 the area open for black’s to find housing remained much the same as in
1932 with the expansion of the northern boundary to E. Wright Street. The area was also
increasingly populated by African American migrants, as much as two thirds of the
population. While ever greater numbers of blacks were moving into Milwaukee’s
working class neighborhoods whites began their post-war movement to the fringes of the
city and ultimately the suburbs.7 A general trend of the movement of black residential
into neighborhoods on the city’s northwest side began to take shape.
The 1940s also witnessed the emergence of a central African American
residential, business and entertainment district, known as Bronzeville, centered on the
Walnut St. area. Taverns, jazz clubs, barbershops, drugstores, and funeral homes had
been established in the neighborhood to meet the demands of Milwaukee’s growing
African American population. This centralization of black capital was not enough to
counter the flight of white capital. Many black owned businesses had also catered to
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many of the working class whites who were leaving the area for better homes and
neighborhoods on the fringes of the city and in the suburbs.8
Few new housing units were being constructed, and there wasn’t enough capital
in the area to maintain old housing units contributing to the further decay of housing
stock in the area. This growth of blight, a catch all term for the physical breakdown and
decay of housing stock, which accompanied the growth of Milwaukee’s black population
gave city planners an objective cause for further attempts at controlling and containing
the growth of African American residential areas in the city. Anything that was seen as
unsightly was deemed blight; from chipped and peeling paint on a house, to an unkempt
vacant lot, to a fully dilapidated housing structure. The issue of blight was seized upon by
city planners in order to enact a variety of plans which engineered effective racial
segregation in the city, something that racially restrictive covenants and gentlemen’s
agreements were unable to do.9
These concerns about the continued growth of the city’s African American
population, the social issues surrounding such a dramatic increase, and rising racial
tensions found its expression in 1960 with the publication of The Final Report of the
Mayor’s Study Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City,
commonly known as the Zeidler Report. The report reveals the degree of marginalization
that African Americans were facing at the start of the 1960s in the city. Social and
economic conditions had stagnated or declined for the majority of black women. Single
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parent families were on the rise, and the number of black women on the welfare rolls was
increasing. Additionally unemployment for black men was significantly higher than it
was for whites.
The committee was tasked by Mayor Frank Zeidler with identifying social
problems in the Inner Core, and then making suggestions to ameliorate the problems. The
catalyst for the production of the report was two killings in the summer of 1959. On
September 22nd Sylvia Fink, a white woman, was brutally murdered in her home by
Roscoe Simpson, an African American man; a day later the police killed Simpson. These
two killings brought racial tensions to a fever pitch in the city with blacks and whites
fearing violent retaliation from each other.10
The report located the problems of Milwaukee’s African American population in
the breakdown of the traditional family structure. According to final report of the Mayors
study committee “as the number of these families increased their behavior patterns
became more noticeable and in many instances disturbing.”11This report focused on an
arbitrary geographic region denoted as the Inner Core. The Inner Core was defined as the
area between W. Juneau Ave. to the south, W. Keefe to the north, N. Holton to the east,
and N. 20th. St. to the west. They chose this area because of the aging housing stock and
because a significant number of poor Southern migrants, almost entirely black, were

“Zeidler: Same Enforcement of the Laws for All,” The Milwaukee Sentinel, September 22nd
1959.
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=a6oVAAAAIBAJ&sjid=ExAEAAAAIBAJ&pg=7565,18
29232&dq=mayor%27s+study+committee+on+social+problems+in+the+inner+core+area&hl=en
, Accessed on May 8th 2011.
11
Mayor’s Study Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City, Summary of
final report of Mayor’s Study Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City
(Milwaukee, The Mayors Study Committee, 1960), 8.
10

41

settling in the area. Some of the individual reports examined areas beyond the Inner Core
since they felt that similar social problems existed beyond this area.
The study examined a host of social issues associated with the increasing African
American population, including high birth rates, and their confinement to one of the
poorest part of Milwaukee. One area of particular concern of the Committee was “hard
core or multi-problem” families. These families were defined in the study as having “a
chronic problem which is of concern to the community” and which have “received
services over a long period from one or more of the agencies of the community with
significant improvement.”12 A family met these criteria if it was a “functional failure” in
more than one of four areas of raising children. These four areas were “protecting
children during their period of dependency,” “maintaining a personal and/or home life
which will enable the person or family members to develop emotional stability and
maturity,” “accepting and maintaining social controls to the end that the person or
member of the family meets his major responsibility to society,” and “securing and
managing income in order to meet the physical and social necessities for healthful
living.”13
The study reveals concerns about the shifting demographics of the Inner Core area
and the city in general via higher birth rates than white women, and concerns about the
rapid growth of the African American population. Despite their concern about the
migration of African Americans into these areas, with 90% of Milwaukee’s non-white
population residing in the Inner Core in 1950, it remained dominated by white residents
with only 19.1% of the areas total population being non-white. The study also raised
Mayor’s Study Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City, Report on
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13
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significant concerns surrounding the birth rate in the Inner Core. Women in the Inner
Core were having children at a much higher rate than the rest of the city. The birth rate in
1950 for the Inner Core was 25.8 births per 1,000 people, for the city as a whole it was
22.7. In 1957 the birth rare in the Inner core had risen to 31.5, while for the city it was
only 26.2. 14
The report suggested that more could be done to promote birth control amongst
residents of the inner core to bring birth rates in line with the cities and slow the pace of
growth in the African American community. The Zeidler Report proposed:
An intensive and extensive education in the several accepted methods of birth control.
These methods would be chosen and taught in terms of the capacity of the marital
partners to understand and utilize the various methods and according to the religious
beliefs of the couple.15

The committee believed that they should control the growth of the African American
population by promoting birth control, even though most of the population increase came
from migrants from the southern states seeking employment in the city. They were
especially worried that the live birth rate for blacks was beginning to far outpace infant
mortality rates. Expressing an overbearing sense of paternalism toward African
Americans in the city the committee worried that an increase in births was putting greater
amounts of economic pressure on women and their families.
In addition to focusing on the birth rate of African American women the study
also examined the growing number of women in the Inner Core on the welfare rolls, and
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an increase of “hard- core or multi-problem families” in the area. They found that though
the Inner Core contained roughly 10% of Milwaukee’s total population in 1950, 51% of
the people receiving Aid to Dependent Children resided in the area, and nearly 40% of
the people receiving General Financial Assistance.16 These numbers illustrated the day to
day struggle that many African American women in Milwaukee were facing at the
beginning of the post-war period. There was no significant progress in a socio-economic
sense for the vast majority of black people in the city.
The Zeidler Report stressed the need for an increase in social programs in the
Inner Core, and the development of educational facilities at every level. It also called for
more job training programs to give experience to Southern migrants, and additionally
calls for the elimination of employment discrimination so that more industrial jobs would
be open to African Americans. They hoped to decrease poverty and increase employment
through a multi-faceted approach that would touch every aspect of African Americans
lives. The committee suggested that a combination of education, job training, welfare,
private sector job creation, improved social services, public leisure facilities, and urban
renewal projects could ameliorate the problems that residents of the Inner Core faced.
As Milwaukee’s African American population began to grow after World War II
the city became one of the most racially segregated in America. The African-American
population became confined to an area deemed by the city government as the Inner Core.
As defined by the Zeidler Report in 1960 the Inner Core is bound by Keefe Ave on the
North, W. Juneau Ave on the South, Holton Ave and the Milwaukee River on the East
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and N. 20th Street on the West.17 African Americans had a presence in nearly every
neighborhood of the city by 1960, but not in significant numbers, due to restrictive
covenants, redlining, and personal prejudices of landowners and landlords. The
neighborhoods with the greatest African American population in 1960, Halyard Park and
Garfield Avenue, roughly cover the Inner Core as defined by the Zeidler Report. Ninetyone percent of Milwaukee’s African American population lived in the Inner Core, which
made up a total of 5.63 square miles, or 6.98% of the city’s total land area.18
As the African American population began to grow in these neighborhoods in the
1960s and 1970s the population became increasingly concentrated. A variety of urban
renewal projects served to negatively impact many in the African American community
and reinforce patterns of segregation including the construction of Highway 43 through
multiple neighborhoods on the city’s Northwest side including the historic center of
African American life in the city, Bronzeville, the Kilbourntown No. 3 and Eastside A
projects which demolished nearly all of the buildings in areas just to the North and West
of the Downtown area, as well as the Midtown project west of North 20th Street between
State Street and Vliet Street which preserved some of the existing housing stock in the
area.19

17

The Mayor's Study Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City, Final
Report to the Honorable Frank P. Zeidler, Mayor, City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee: The Mayor's
Study Committee, 1960), 5.
18
Ibid. Annex D., 1.
19
Gurda, The Making of Milwaukee, 394-394.

45

Freeway Construction in Context
Out of all of these urban renewal and redevelopment projects the construction of
the North-South Expressway (referred to as Highway 43) from 1962 to 1968 had the
greatest negative impact on Milwaukee’s African American community. The highway cut
through the heart of the African American community. The African American
community in 1960 made up roughly 8% of Milwaukee’s total population, and by 1970
comprised nearly 15%.20 Despite their minority status in the city, African Americans
accounted for more than half of the people that would be displaced by the construction of
Milwaukee’s highway system in the 1960s.21
As in many other urban centers in the United States with substantial black
communities, such as Detroit, Miami and Charlotte highway construction led to the
destruction of homes, businesses, and property, and the displacement of thousands of
people. In 1956 Miami began construction of a highway interchange system that cut
through the heart of Overtown, the city’s main African American neighborhood. Upon its
completion the interchange had eliminated over two dozen city blocks, much of this the
central black business district. Overtown was located on the edge of the downtown
business district and planers hoped the interchange would increase property values and
attract more people downtown by pushing blacks further from the central business district
and giving ease of access to those who owned automobiles. Since their goal was
20
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displacement of the city’s African American population there was little concern among
freeway planners and boosters for the relocation of the dispossessed.22
The construction of freeways in Miami spurred the emergence of a second ghetto.
Pressure from the freeways spurred the growth of black enclaves further away from the
central business district. As more and more black families were displaced or threatened
with displacement in the first ghetto, Overtown, they moved into two separate areas of
Miami known as Liberty City and Brownsville. Though the concerted effort of relators
and city planners these two areas merged and by beginning of the 1960s Liberty City
emerged as the center of black population in the city, the second ghetto. Through the
strategic placement of the freeway system city planners had succeeded in pushing the
cities black ghetto further and further from the central business district. 23
In Detroit one of the most significant centers of black life and culture to emerge
after World War I, Black Bottom and its business district Paradise Valley, were razed by
urban renewal and freeway construction in the 1960s.24 Most residents of Black Bottom
were employed by the auto companies and as plants moved out of the city and workers
lost their jobs the neighborhood fell into an increase state of disrepair. As in other cities
these conditions of blight were used to justify the destruction of the neighborhood and
placement of freeways as an attempt to spur economic growth. Black Bottom/Paradise
Valley located just to the east of the downtown area was replaced by the Chrysler
Freeway and a mixed income high rise housing complex designed by famed Modernist
22
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Mies van der Roh known as Lafayette Park.25 Once again these redevelopment projects
had the effect of pushing working class blacks away from the central business district and
disrupting long established black-owned business. Very few of those displaced were able
to afford or even locate housing in their redeveloped neighborhoods.26
In Charlotte, North Carolina the historic African American neighborhood of
Brooklyn was completely razed by the city’s Redevelopment Authority with the
assistance of federal funds between 1960 and 1967. 1,007 families were displaced by the
project while there was no effort to replace the 1,480 structures which were demolished.
The neighborhood which was located just to the east of the downtown area was replaced
by private offices, businesses, a government complex and a brand new city park. Other
African American neighborhoods were disrupted by urban renewal projects throughout
the city including a black business district which was replaced by the Charlotte
Convention Center and a Radisson Hotel. As in the other cases these projects had the
effect of pushing African Americans in Charlotte away from the expanded central
business district, into overcrowded existing black neighborhoods and into white working
class neighborhoods.27
Plans for the construction of a highway system in Milwaukee began soon after the
Federal government began funding construction on the Interstate highway system with
the passage of the Interstate Highway Act of 1956. These plans, based on the German
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Autobahn system, served two distinct purposes, first for strategic defense purposes, and
second to facilitate the transportation of goods and people quickly across the country as a
means of stimulating economic growth. City planners within the Federal government and
in metropolitan areas across the nation believed it of the utmost importance that the
United States have an efficient highway system to facilitate the defense of cities in case
of an attack by the Soviet menace. Planners believed that building an intricate and
efficient highway system would also increase the economic capacity of the country’s
growing cities, and would also help alleviate population concentration and urban decay.
The U.S. highway system, instead of skirting around urban populations, would cut right
through cities. Planners hoped these new routes would facilitate the return of white
suburbanites and their wealth to the city. In hopes to ensure the return of wealthy whites
the highway would be built right through the African American community.28
Milwaukee began planning for the construction of its own highways in the late
1940s prior to the commitment of full-fledged federal support. One plan created in 1949
by DeLeuw, Cather and Company had two North South expressways which ran through
areas with low population density. They designed a plan that would displace relatively
few people and follow the natural geography and population patterns of the city.29 This
plan would have placed the freeways through open areas of the city including county
parkland and along the lakefront. But by 1962, when highway construction began in the
African American community, the city had discarded the DeLeuw plan in favor of one
that would cut through the densely populated Inner Core and would displace thousands of
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people within the African American community, in the process paving over thousands of
homes and businesses. It was much more politically expedient to build through areas
which were determined to be blighted and which exhibited slum-like conditions than
through highly valued parkland.
The recommendations of the Zeidler Report published in March of 1960 made
city leaders and highway planners more than aware of the hardship their decision to build
the highway through the Inner Core would cause. The report’s second recommendation
stated the situation quite clearly:
Another phase of the problems of the inner core that seemed most pressing and
yet ignored by the public as well as the private agencies is the fact that within a
relatively short span of years it is anticipated that 6,000 families will be displaced
by public action such as expressways, urban renewal, and through code
enforcement. A substantial part of this displacement of people will occur in the
inner core area where housing is already a serious problem and where mobility is
restricted...It is therefore the recommendation of this committee that a central
relocation agency be established to do research on housing availability and to
assist people displaced by various city and county public works to find adequate
homes.30

The Zeidler Report’s chapter, Report on Size, Physical Characteristics and
Population in the Inner Core, once again addressed the impact highway construction
would have on the community. The report’s authors recognized that the displacement of
land caused by the construction of the freeway would impact a significant amount of
residential space. The table indicates that they expected 148.8 acres of land would be
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displaced in the Inner Core. 95 of those displaced acres would be residential, and defined
only 1.53 of the acres lost as vacant.31
These dire warnings from the Committee fell in to the laps of indifferent city
leaders. Political leaders voiced little concern over the social effects of displacement in
the lead up to construction. Eliminating urban decay concerned city leaders much more
than limiting the negative social and economic effects construction might have. Highway
construction served as a precursor to urban renewal, it allowed city leaders to reconfigure
a portion of the city without the consent of the people living in the targeted areas. In an
interview in 2005 former Milwaukee Mayor Frank Zeidler commented on the impetus for
placing the highway through African American communities, stating that “In one sense
the freeway did get rid of a lot of blight. The freeway routes. Of course, that’s why they
picked them.”32
Though their actions would displace thousands of people, politicians felt a vital
service was being to done to both white and black residents by eliminating the most
impoverished areas of the city. Relocation assistance in the form of monetary payments
for moving fees did come from the County government. Available aid came in the form
of $200 from the Milwaukee County Expressway Commission Relocation Division to
assist in moving costs for home owners and for tenants with at least three year lease.33
Even though thousands of people had been displaced by construction, and
thousands more expected only two state highway employees worked to assist families
31

Ibid. Annex D.
“empty streets » Nik Kovac's Interview with Frank Zeidler,” Empty Streets,
http://emptystreets.net/blog/?page_id=84, Accessed May 9, 2014.
33
Patricia A House, Families Displaced by Expressway Development: A Geographical Study of
Relocation in Milwaukee (Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin Photoduplication Dept, 1972), 86.
32

51

relocate. In addition these relocation services lacked adequate publicity therefore a
majority of displaced families never knew about the meager compensation made
available to them by the state. Professor of Urban Studies and Planning Bernard J Frieden
states it quite plainly when he says that “relocation is clearly an incidental function in the
case of highways, and there is no strong motivation to extend more than a minimum of
aid.”34 The lack of a serious to assist in the relocation of those displaced by these projects
indicates that there was no real desire to help those people that lived in targeted
neighborhoods. Perhaps it expressed a desire on the behalf of city leaders and planners
that poor African Americans might be driven out of the city entirely and back to the
places from which they had migrated.
Patricia House addresses the impact of displacement by the construction of the
north south expressway in her study, Families Displaced by Expressway Development: A
Geographical Study of Relocation in Milwaukee. She concludes that African Americans
moved significantly shorter distances when displaced and that a majority of displaced
families relocated in areas already occupied by a black majority. Displacement caused an
increase in the area’s population concentration, and acted to further segregate as white
people left the area, and black people only moved an average of a few blocks from their
previous home. She found that race was the most important factor when it came to the
displacement and resettlement of families. House discovered direct discrimination against
African Americans by property owners and real estate agencies, indirect discrimination
against African Americans due to psychological fears and prejudices of the white
population, and the avoidance of African American neighborhoods by whites. In a survey
34
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that House conducted she found assistance from the Relocation Division of the County
Expressway Commission the least utilized out of several options by displaced people to
find a new home.35 Only ever employing two people, it would have been an impossible
task for this Relocation Division to adequately assist the thousands of the people that had
been displaced. Though city and county activities displaced thousands of people little
compensation and even less compassion came from public officials who held the most
responsibility. No one at any level of government took full responsibility for disrupting
the African American community, and disrupting the lives of thousands of citizens.
On November 8th 1966 Mayor Henry Maier passed the responsibility of assisting
displaced people to the county. Attempting to use compassionate of language he framed
the displacement of people as a “human problem” which everyone in the County held
responsibility for, not just in the city. Maier stated, “Responsibility for the slums of the
metropolitan area does not disappear when you walk across the center of N. 60th or
Edgewood Ave.”36 Maier spoke for the city leaders as he passed the buck onto someone
else. If he truly cared about the “human problem” he could have vocalized support for
open housing, or plans for public housing placed throughout the cities, and allocated city
funds to ease the process of displacement.
Displaced persons were given the distinct perception of being a nuisance for the
city, it would be a massive undertaking to properly relocate people and adequately repay
them for their loss, and if the city government just passed on the issue it would not have
to expend any money. The city’s leadership saw African Americans as a nuisance prior
35
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to, during, and after highway construction. City officials seemed to believe it possible to
eliminate the nuisance African Americans caused by paving over what they saw as the
absolute worst areas in the city.
In early 1968 criticism of highway construction and its impact on the African
American community emerged from prominent Milwaukee Attorney Leonard Zubrensky.
Zubrensky became the only major critic of the city’s handling of construction and
displaced peoples to emerge from amongst the city leadership. He served as the secretary
of the Milwaukee Country Expressway Commission, putting him in a unique and credible
position from which to critique highway construction. On July 7th 1968 Zubrensky
vocalized his concern: “If need be we must put the brake on our expressway programs in
order to give massive attention to the problem of dislocation and relocation until this
grave social problem is under control.”37 In a Milwaukee Sentinel article titled ‘Family
Relocated, Plight Described’ Zubrensky noted the injustice of the situation: “There is
something basically wrong with the system. It’s affecting those least able to help
themselves.” 38
After six years of construction and displacement a member of the political elite
considered the plight of the people who highway construction had displaced, but it came
too late to achieve any meaningful abatement of the grave injustice committed by city
leaders’ decisions. At the time that Zubrensky raised his concerns, over 13,000 people
had been displaced by expressway construction with meager assistance or compensation
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from city, county, state or federal governments.39 Between the years of 1962 and 1967
highway construction destroyed 8,535 housing units. With only 1,198 new housing units
rebuilt a severe housing shortage served to compound the complications the African
American community experience due to highway construction through the Inner Core.40
Not only had individuals and families been displaced but they faced diminished options
of available housing as there was no one for one replacement of demolished housing
stock in the areas on the Northwest side of the city where blacks were allowed to live.
Through a close examination of the evidence it becomes quite clear that very few
white leaders had the will to take on the responsibility of assisting in the re-housing and
compensation of the displaced. Though glaringly apparent the entire time, everyone in a
position of power kept passing the buck and the impoverished fell through the cracks.
Proposals to scatter low income housing and public housing for the displaced throughout
the city, in order to avoid the re-concentration of the impoverished, never materialized.
Vocal opposition came from within the white community to any new public housing
being built in their neighbor hood, because it would inevitably house mostly African
Americans. In addition African Americans had a much more difficult time finding
adequate housing, than their fellow displaced whites did. After Attorney Zubrensky
raised a critical voice Mayor Maier spoke in favor of an examination of the effects of
major government construction projects, saying, “In all our renewal efforts we must first
make sure that the problem of people is fully taken into account.”41 This speech came off
as an empty gesture to the thousands of people who had already been displaced by
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highway construction. Actions and criticism brought forth in 1968 and 1969 came too
late to mean anything to the majority of people displaced by highway construction
throughout the 1960s.
Ruth Zubrensky, in A Report on Past Discrimination against African Americans
in Milwaukee, 1835-1999, argues that racial discrimination formed the basis for the lack
of equitable assistance for the relocation of African Americans. She found that they were
not provided with real alternatives which would have allowed them to locate housing
anywhere in the city. Blacks displaced by urban renewal projects were effectively
restricted to relocating in the same inner city neighborhoods and many returned to
overcrowded housing conditions.
Zubrensky quotes Richard Perrin, director of the Department of City
Development during the period of mass displacements, who stated that, “most Blacks did
not want to move from the core area because they wished to remain near the persons
whom they were used to associating.”42 The kind of racial stereotypes put forward by
people like Perrin contributed to the lack of relocation service for African Americans, and
served to strengthen segregation in the city. Policies enacted by political leaders at the
very top of the city government contributed to the lack of assistance, re-concentration of
population, and disproportionate impact on the African American community.
Construction of Highway 43 cut the heart of the African American community in
two. The highway served as a concrete wall that split the African American community,
and served to further separate the African American community from the rest of the city.
42
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Highway 43 joined the Milwaukee River and the Menominee River Valley as the lines
that served to demarcate racial separation in housing, business, and education. Though
the government held all the responsibility for destroying homes, businesses, and property;
they did little to rectify all of the physical, psychological, and economic, destruction that
highway construction caused. People had largely been left to their own devices in finding
a way to survive being uprooted by the hand of the powerful political elite.
The African American community due to its small size did not have the political
power to control its own destiny. Population size and concentration made it possible for
the community to remain at the whim of the white power structure. The city and county
governments forced the highway through the area with surprisingly little protest from
residents in and around the immediate area that would be transformed into a massive
ribbon of concrete. The African American community lacked the economic and political
power necessary to stop the concrete monster from eating up an entire corridor of the
neighborhood. Homes, businesses, memories, and histories had been completely
obliterated and paved over by Highway 43.
The lives of those people who lived in its path would be altered forever, and they
were effectively cast aside by the very government that had removed them from their
homes. Though their homes, businesses, and land had been taken from them and
reapportioned for this economic conduit, the highway did nothing to improve the
economic situation of the African American community. The city used the highway in an
attempt to woo the wealthy white residents who had fled the city for the suburbs, taking
their pocketbooks and tax dollars with them. City leaders did not build Highway 43 for
African Americans living in the Inner Core. The African American community only
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came to mind because they stood in the way of economic progress and easing access to
and from the growing suburbs surrounding the city.
The construction of a concrete barrier through and around the African American
community, and the displacement of thousands of people without equitable compensation
had only negative effects for that community. Long after construction had been
completed economic conditions in Milwaukee’s African American community worsened,
and the so called “urban blight” that city leaders claimed to strive to eliminate only
increased. According to city leaders the highway system was a vitally necessary means of
encouraging economic progress, and a means of improving the cities physical
appearance. The heart of their neighborhood had been sliced in two and in the process the
African American community had been excluded from any share in this economic
progress. Public officials viewed the plight of the African American community as a
hindrance, easily paved over, and summarily forgotten, all in the name of economic
progress and national defense.
The construction of Highway 43 through Milwaukee’s African American
community, and the subsequent abandonment of displaced citizens reveal the devastating
influence of racism in Milwaukee’s history. Segregationist policies in the city planner
tool box included urban renewal projects, such as Kilbourntown-3, which entirely
demolished poor and blighted neighborhoods that African American’s lived in due to
their lower economic standing; and public housing projects, many of which initially
restricted access for black residents while those that allowed black occupants were sited
in already segregated neighborhoods reinforcing the negative pattern. The pretense of
urban renewal was that it would improve conditions for those living in the neighborhoods
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that were to be renewed. Renewal often resulted in the complete removal of previous
residents, and their replacement with fewer and wealthier residents. Where public
housing was built it often failed to replace the number of housing units it displaced,
forcing families to move elsewhere.43

Conclusion
In the 1950s and 1960s freeway construction emerged as the most significant tool
to be wielded in the engineering of impoverished and decidedly segregated African
American ghettos throughout the United States. The already existing patterns of
segregation were seized upon in the construction of the freeway system setting up a
physical barrier placed in such a way as to reinforce patterns of segregation and social
exclusion. Freeway construction was the culmination of six decades of efforts to control
and confine Milwaukee’s rapidly growing African America population. With the
placement of the freeway system roughly along the Menomonee River Valley and the
Milwaukee River it reinforced the barriers that had been established by realtors,
politicians, and private agreements. The freeways cemented on the land patterns of
residential segregation and exclusion. Racially restrictive covenants and other private
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agreements were no longer a necessity, the new lay of the land made it quite clear where
a person of one race or another should live in the city.44
In addition to cementing patterns of segregation, freeway construction also
destroyed businesses, housing, and centers of community and culture. Bronzeville,
considered by many to be the center of African American life in Milwaukee was
obliterated by the construction of the North South freeway known today as I-43. African
Americans had established themselves in this area as early as the 1930s if not earlier. The
freeway cut through their business district which was centered on Walnut St. Those
businesses that were not physically wiped out by the placement of the freeway between
7th and 8th streets, eventually withered away due to the lack of business thanks to the
displacement of patrons and a precipitous decline in property values. It is around the time
of the completion of the freeway when Milwaukee’s second ghetto emerged in the 1960s,
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and the point from which African Americans would begin their expansion into the city’s
Northwest side in search of better housing within the city.
The displacement of African Americans in Milwaukee’s restricted housing market
contributed to the increase in the concentration of the black population which contributed
to the growth of impoverished and blighted areas in the city. A desperate cycle of poverty
and population concentration contributed to the emergence of the second ghetto. In their
search for better housing middle class African American’s began to move into areas on
the fringes of the already existing ghetto. As they moved away from the inner parts of the
original ghetto they were replaced by an increasingly impoverished population. The
African American residential area grew outward in a North and West fashion moving
further away from the freeways and into shrinking white residential areas.
In addition to destroying established African American neighborhoods the
freeways also worked to reinforce patterns of residential segregation and serve as a
bulwark against the physical expansion of African American neighborhoods. In
Milwaukee the freeways followed the traditional lines of racial segregation the
Milwaukee River and the Menominee River Valley. To the east of the Milwaukee River
and south of the Menominee River Valley black residents were few and far between in
the post-war period. In the late 1960s Civil Rights activists would march from the North
side to the South side across the 16th street viaduct protesting for an open housing law.
Revealing the stark geographic divide residents often joked that this was the longest
bridge in the world, since it connected Africa to Poland.
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The outward expansion of African American residential areas continued until they
reached suburban municipal boundaries. Black migration has been severely limited,
making the Milwaukee on the most segregated metropolitan areas in the country. The
annexation of Granville in the northwest corner of Milwaukee County in the 1960s
opened up space for Milwaukee’s rapidly expanding African American population to
continue their search for better homes and neighborhoods away from the reinforced racial
boundaries in the city and towards the reinforced racial boundaries of the suburbs.45 The
freeways fortification of established racial boundaries served to cement the Northwest
portion of the city as predominantly African American, and reserved the South and East
sides for the white population that still lived and worked in the city.46
Despite all the bulldozing and the miles and miles of concrete the freeway
booster’s dreams of impending prosperity went unrealized. Instead of bringing prosperity
to America’s urban centers freeway construction contributed to the continual physical
and economic decline of cities well into the 1970s and beyond. Rather than ameliorating
the process of deindustrialization in urban areas freeways served to only quicken the
pace. Industries could locate further and further from their workforce, meaning they
could locate in areas with low property and income taxes. People who worked in central
cities could more easily commute from the suburbs. Freeways promoted the growth of the
suburbs, and the continual decline of central cities, the complete opposite of their
promise. The only thing freeways were truly effective at was strengthening and
solidifying patterns of racial segregation.

45

Gurda, The Making of Milwaukee, 390.
Greg Carman, “Wall of Exclusion: the Persistence of Segregation in Milwaukee,” (Ph. D. diss.,
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2011), 74-78.
46

62

The next chapter will challenge the notion of urban renewal as “negro removal”
by examining an instance where African Americans in Milwaukee sought to redevelop a
black neighborhood in their own way, with substantial input from residents. African
Americans were not simply the passive victims of urban renewal, the attempt to
redevelop the Harambee neighborhood represents and important intersection of black
agency with the implementation of urban renewal programs in the 1960s and 1970s.

Chapter 3
Pulling Together: The Development of Milwaukee’s Harambee Neighborhood
Introduction
The Harambee neighborhood and revitalization efforts emerged as a response the
disastrous impact of the urban renewal projects discussed in the previous chapters.
Though they were often victims the impact of urban renewal did not represent passive
outcomes, many African Americans were active in attempting to shape the process.
Harambee provides a case study which gives a better understanding of African
American’s experience of urban renewal and the vital role of black agency in shaping the
process. This chapter will develop a better understanding of the development of social
and economic conditions in Milwaukee and the Harambee neighborhood in the 1970s and
one particular way that people living in that neighborhood and this city responded. It will
contribute to a broader discussion about neighborhood redevelopment and the
implications of this history for us today.
One result of urban renewal projects in Milwaukee was to strengthen black civic
engagement. Individuals who emerged as important community leaders, such as Reuben
Harpole, became embedded in the social and political networks which provided fuel for
the development of a strong African American middle class and the development of the
necessary political networks to represent their interests as the city, state and national
levels.
Developments in the Harambee neighborhood are a quintessential example. As
industrial employment began to fade away in the 1960s and 1970s at the precise moment
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that blacks were winning increased access to good paying blue collar jobs, African
Americans attempted to use resources made available through Great Society anti-poverty
programs to alleviate emerging social and economic issues in discreet ways. A small but
stable black middle class developed out of the urban renewal initiatives that were aimed
at sparking new economic growth in the city.
At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s enormous shifts in the
global economy along with the relative decline of American capitalism was starting to
drain Milwaukee of the industrial jobs which had drawn tens of thousands of African
Americans to the city since the beginning of World War II. Three decades of economic
prosperity were coming to a close for the “Machine Shop of the World.” This can be seen
most clearly in population trends for the city. Milwaukee’s population peaked in the 1960
U.S. Census with an official tally of 741,324 residents.1 The following census in 1970
marked the first time in the city’s history that it had witnessed a decline in its total
population dropping 3.3 percent to 717,099.2
Deindustrialization began to take its hold on the metropolitan region between
1967 and 1977 manufacturing employment dropped by 5.8 percent.3 A long era of growth
and prosperity, which had for decades drawn tens of thousands of foreign immigrants and
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internal migrants to the city had officially closed for the city of Milwaukee. These trends
contributed to the development of disruptive urban renewal projects which city leaders
hoped would rejuvenate economic and population growth witnessed in previous decades.
This process expressed itself most starkly in the economic and social decline of
Milwaukee’s African American working class neighborhoods as industrial employers
shed jobs and shuttered factories. The last hired and the first fired in industrial
employment, African American men and women experienced the worst of the
deindustrialization that would remake urban centers throughout America’s emerging rust
belt. The unemployment rate for blacks in the city of Milwaukee was 8.3 percent and rose
to 13.9 percent by the end of the decade in 1980.4 Real median family income for African
Americans in Milwaukee dropped 22 percent between 1970 and 1980, as a proportion of
white family median income it fell from 70.4 percent to 59.4 percent.5
As result of this economic decline black working class neighborhoods fell into
precipitous spirals of decline. Homeowners were no longer able to provide upkeep for
aging housing stock leading to the physical decline of aging housing and infrastructure.
While a small number of African American’s in the city were able to capitalize on the
promises of the Civil Rights era and advance into the middle class, the vast majority of
blacks in Milwaukee’s inner city were increasingly condemned to declining wages,
increasing rates of poverty and entrenched unemployment. Between 1970 and 1980 the
percentage of African Americans living in poverty rose moderately from 27.1 percent to
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29.5 percent, but the number of African Americans living in high poverty census tracts in
the city grew 46 percent from 17,319 to 31,982.6
The present-day inner city ghetto marked by boarded up homes and vacant lots
was taking shape even as efforts were being formulated to combat these worsening social
conditions. The legislative gains of the Civil Rights era proved to be inadequate to
address the needs to the masses of African Americans. An era of promise and hope for
social progress had given way to an era of deindustrialization and sky rocketing rates of
unemployment and poverty.

Fighting Decline with Revitalization
Many of the more liberal minded African Americans, who belonged to the middle
class including academics, university employees, unionized industrial workers, and white
collar workers, turned their attention to what they quite correctly concluded were the
worsening social and economic conditions for the great numbers of black people in
Milwaukee. The task as they saw it was not just to improve their own social station, but
to use their skills to help those African Americans who were suffering the injustices of
urban poverty. They were joined by academic reformers, such as Belden Paulson, and
community activists, such as Reuben Harpole, who were concerned with the impact of
growing poverty on African Americans in Milwaukee. Paulson and Harpole worked to
turn their social and economic positions to funnel pools of federal money from Title I of
the Higher Education Act to the redevelopment and revitalization of Milwaukee’s
6
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African American neighborhoods in the form of the Harambee Revitalization Project
(HRP).
The HRP had its roots in the social upheavals of the 1960s and the push by
African Americans for equality before the law and the elimination of racial segregation
and discrimination in the United States. The Open Housing movement in Milwaukee
guided by the NAACP Youth Council, Father James Groppi and Alderwoman Vel
Phillips provided much of the impetus for other social activism in the city of Milwaukee.
The city also had a vibrant movement aimed at improving public education for African
American youth, with a strong legal push to desegregate Milwaukee Public Schools
spearheaded by Attorney Lloyd Barbee between 1965 and 1976.7
The national Civil Rights movement, led by Martin Luther King, the NAACP,
SNCC, and CORE augmented the local fights for social change. Reuben Harpole, the
guiding hand behind the attempt to revitalize the Harambee neighborhood attests to this
in his narrative history of the project, stating that “During the turbulent sixties, I, like
many other people in Milwaukee’s general community, was caught up in the quest for
equal rights as advocated by Dr. Martin Luther King, James Farmer, and many others.”8
The lessons of the 1960s Civil Rights movement’s success and failures were
instrumental in guiding the activity of community activists in the 1970s. Frustration with
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the slow pace of the Civil Rights movement gave way to much more radical notions of
what was necessary to end the oppression of African Americans in the United States.
When Stokely Carmichael gave his first speech raising the slogan of “Black Power” in
1966 he was tapping into concepts which had deep roots in black social movements, from
Marcus Garvey’s United Negro Improvement Association and Back to Africa Movement
to the Pan-Africanism of the anti-colonial struggles in Africa. Demands for racial
integration and equality before the law for some had given way to demands for selfdetermination and Black Power. Strong currents of Pan-Africanism and demands for
Black Power expressed themselves in the push to redevelop the Harambee neighborhood
in Milwaukee. One of the most apparent testaments to this was the choice of the name for
the neighborhood, Harambee, a Swahili term which when literally translated means “pull
together.”9
This chapter will examine the history of the attempt to revitalize the Harambee
neighborhood in the face of deteriorating social and economic conditions. The Harambee
Revitalization Project represents an important instance in which African Americans in the
city of Milwaukee attempted to reshape urban renewal programs into something that
would improve rather than destroy one their neighborhoods. It will trace the history from
the initial inception of the HRP in the early 1970s until the near dissolution of the
Harambee Development Corporation (HDC) in 1978. Through Harambee, a mostly black
neighborhood organization contended with the consequences of worsening social
conditions for the majority of blacks in the city and struggled to find a way to alter this
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decline in one particular part of the city. The Harambee project marked the convergence
of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, emerging notions concerning Black Power
and self-determination, and an influx of federal funding for community based programs
through the Great Society initiatives established by the administration of Lyndon
Johnson. These trends that emerged from social upheavals in the 1960s came together
and fell apart in the 170 block area that became known as the Harambee neighborhood.
The attempts to revitalize the Harambee neighborhood in Milwaukee tell us
something about the state of the Civil Rights movement by the 1970s as well as provide a
lesson in the difficulties involved in achieving significant and lasting social change at the
local level. Milwaukee’s industrial economy was entering into a terminal decline at the
very moment that African Americans involved in Civil Rights activism demanded a
greater share of the economic pie. These changes had a dramatic effect on the demands of
activists and what they thought was possible as they attempted to utilize federal
legislation passed in the 1960s to combat deteriorating social conditions in the 1970s.

Reuben Harpole: Mastermind of Harambee
Foremost amongst the local black activists and reformers in Milwaukee who saw
promise in working at the local level was Reuben Harpole. Harpole operated as the main
impetus behind the project to revitalize the Harambee neighborhood and would guide it,
often from behind the scenes as well as functioning a representative of the University of
Wisconsin Extension (UWEX). Harpole and others, inspired by the successes of the
national Civil Rights movement and the development of President Lyndon Johnson’s
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Great Society programs, worked to revitalize Milwaukee’s African American
community.
After several years of working for the Post Office, and inspired by the burgeoning
Civil Rights movement, Harpole became a community activists in 1960 working as the
circulation manager and selling advertisements for the Milwaukee Star, one of the city’s
African American newspapers. He then found employment in the mid-1960s with the
UWEX’s Center for Community Leadership Development (CCLD) where he would
guide the development the HRP.10 His position in the CCLD would serve as a launching
pad for his development into one of the leading social reformers in the city of Milwaukee.
Harpole since went on to become known as “the mayor of Black Milwaukee” for the
leadership role he has played since the 1970s through his position as a community
outreach specialist at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the Helen Bader
Foundation.11
Harpole witnessed firsthand the transformation of the Harambee neighborhood
(formerly known as the Garfield Park neighborhood) from a predominately ethnic
German working class neighborhood to an overwhelmingly black working class
neighborhood. The transition process began in 1959 as land clearance for the construction
of Highway 43 forced an increasing number of African Americans north, northwest, and
east out of the Bronzeville neighborhood.12 The transformation of the neighborhood was
expressed most notably in the renaming of parks, churches, and schools and roads
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throughout the neighborhood: in the late 1970s Garfield Park became Clinton Rose Park;
in 1994 St Elizabeth’s Catholic Church became St Martin de Porres Catholic Church; in
1992 Victor Berger Elementary School became Martin Luther King Jr. Elementary
school; and the portions of Green Bay Ave. and North 3rd St. which run through the
Harambee neighborhood were renamed Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive.13
This transition from a predominantly white community to a predominantly
African American community took less than two decades. While the number of African
Americans in the neighborhood increased between 1960 and 1975 at the same time the
total population of the neighborhood decreased by 25 percent. This population decline
marked a significant outmigration of white residents. The Harambee neighborhood,
bounded by Capitol Drive on the North, North Avenue to the South, Holton Ave to the
east, and Highway 43 to the west was 81.9 percent black by 1975. While in that same
year African American’s made up only 18.5 percent of the entire city’s population.14
The neighborhood’s social indicators were found to be significantly lagging the
city as a whole. While the individual poverty rate for the City of Milwaukee was 11.4
percent the Harambee neighborhood had an individual poverty rate of 25 percent. The
median family income in Harambee in 1970 was $7,138 ($42,856 in 2014) compared to
$10,262 ($61,613 in 2014) for the entire city.15 Only 35.8 percent of housing units were
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owner occupied in Harambee compared to 59.8 percent for the city.16 It was these trends
that the founders of the Harambee Revitalization Project had in mind as they attempted to
develop a viable redevelopment program.
In the 1960s the Milwaukee’s Urban League had engaged in early efforts to
stabilize neighborhoods and fight against the negative economic trends taking hold in the
African American community. Inspired to action by civil rights leaders such as Martin
Luther King Jr. and James Farmer, Harpole became involved with this effort as Chairman
of Area 7, which was concerned with stabilizing the neighborhood surrounding St.
Elizabeth Catholic Church (now St. Martin de Porres Catholic Church), located at 128 W.
Burleigh Street. Harpole participated in meetings held at St. Elizabeth between blacks
and whites in the neighborhood in an effort to work out differences and ease tensions
arising out of the neighborhoods rapid racial transition.17
In 1964 former Mayor Frank Zeidler, President of the Thirteenth Ward
Community Council, approached Harpole and asked him to consult with the University
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee as to whether they could assist in improving their
neighborhood. As a result of this Harpole and another neighborhood resident, Harold
Bagin, met with and started working with Dr. Belden Paulson of the University’s
Political Science Department. Harpole and Paulson worked together at the University of
Wisconsin-Extension’s CCLD to develop a program for Harambee.18
Through Paulson and Harpole the CCLD operated as an arm of the UW-Extension
in the community which resulted in a series of studies and programs in the Harambee
16
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neighborhood. This included an educational assessment of a 60 block area in Harambee
in the spring of 1965, a Central City Teacher-Community project in coordination with the
Milwaukee Public Schools, and a series of classes through the Department of Continuing
Education for Women titled “Afro-American in Contemporary Society” held at the
University and in neighborhood churches.19
All of this work by the University in the neighborhood appeared for naught when
civil disturbances erupted in Milwaukee on July 31st 1967. This disrupted plans which
had been in place to attempt to raise the educational level of inner city residents. Between
1967 and 1970 the main focus for the CCLD turned to “sensitivity programs” in an
attempt to decrease tensions between blacks and whites in the city. 20

The Harambee Community School
Plans for the development of a revitalization program emerged out of the
Harambee Community School (HCS), a non-partisan private school formed in 1970,
which was in desperate need of a steady source of funding. Mildred Harpole, the first
principle of HCS, approached her husband Reuben Harpole in 1970 to see if through his
connections in the CCLD he could help establish a source of permanent funds for the
school.21 The creation of the HCS served as the initial catalyst for the Harambee project.
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HCS had emerged out of the old St. Elizabeth’s Catholic School, a change
brought about by the collapse of Milwaukee’s inner-city Catholic parishes through the
1960s, an outcome of the religious and racial transition of Northside working class
neighborhoods. As more well off white families left the city for the suburbs Catholic
parishes were no longer self-supporting and relied increasingly on the arch-diocese for
funding to keep their churches and schools open. Between 1966 and 1971 twenty one
Catholic schools were closed and enrollment plummeted by 20,000 students.22
In the most dramatic example St. Boniface, which once stood just outside of the
Harambee neighborhood at 11th St and Clarke St, had 2,000 families in the late 1940s as
the first African American parishioners began to arrive, by the 1970s the church had
completely collapsed with only 30 families in the parish.23 In 1975 the church that had
served as a civil rights hub in the city of Milwaukee was razed to make room for the
expansion of Milwaukee Public School’s North Division High School.24
The response by the Milwaukee arch-diocese to the funding crisis was to shed
many of its schools and transform them into independent community schools in hopes of
attracting more non-Catholic students, many of whom were young African Americans.
The racial change in Milwaukee’s inner city Catholic schools happened quite rapidly. In
1965 St Elizabeth’s enrollment was 17 percent black, by 1969 the school had a majority
black enrollment and was reorganized as the Harambee Community School. Students at
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the once St. Elizabeth’s now engaged with an experimental pedagogy and black and
white teachers that promoted Black Power, Pan-Africanism, and other radical ideologies.
This dramatic shift toward black radicalism forced many of the last remaining
white Catholic families and staff out of the school completing the transformation to a
school which had a black enrollment of more than 90 percent.25 This represented a
development a period in the Civil Rights movement when African American parents as
well as students expressed a greater demand for the representation of both African
American and African history and culture in education curriculums. Where blacks
became the dominant demographic in public and private schools they demanded greater
control and input over issues of pedagogy, curriculum, and hiring practices.
Despite the radical shift in pedagogy, the school was still faced with the
fundamental question of finding steady funding. This was a perennial problem confronted
by all of the Catholic schools that had transitioned into independent community schools
at the end of the 1960s, and most schools would fold in short time for a lack of funding.
Only the Harambee Community School was successful in securing sources of public and
private funds. In an ironic twist the reason main the school, which promoted Black Power
and self-sufficiency, was able to stay afloat and succeed was thanks to the support of
wealthy white patrons, in particular Adele Christensen of the Miller Brewing family and
philanthropist Jane Bradley Pettit of the Allen-Bradley family.26 Thanks to the support of
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their wealthy patrons the school operated until the end of 2010 when it was shuttered for
a lack of funds.27

The Birth of a Plan for Harambee
In the beginning though Harambee school leaders turned to Reuben Harpole at the
UWEX in an attempt to gain access to public funds for the school and to revitalize the
neighborhood so it might eventually sustain such a school on its own. The first idea that
Harpole proposed was the establishment of a McDonald’s franchise in the neighborhood
which would be run by the school. McDonalds had established a program to assist
schools with financial difficulties by allowing them to operate a restaurant for profit. This
idea fell through with McDonalds claiming that the proposed plot of land at the
intersection of Port Washington Road, Green Bay Avenue, and Keefe Avenue was too
small for a building.28
With the collapse of the McDonalds plan discussions began within the CCLD of
creating a general development plan for the Harambee neighborhood which might lead to
the development of a social and economic environment which would support the
Harambee Community School. They turned their focus to gaining access to funds availed
through Title I of the Higher Education Act of 1965 for developing and enacting a plan
which involved the community and the UWEX working together toward the economic
revitalization of the Harambee neighborhood.
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The Higher Education Act of 1965 was one of the key components of President
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society program, intended to increase funding to public
universities. Title I provided funding to public university’s to encourage educational
efforts “relating to community problems in the areas of housing, government, recreation,
youth opportunities, transportation, health employment, poverty, and land use without
restricting activities to these categories.”29 One of the intentions of Title I was to
encourage public universities to develop a closer working relationship with surrounding
neighborhoods and communities.
Harpole and Paulson worked with Roy Hudson, president of the Harambee School
Board and Bill Desing, another school board member, to put together a grant proposal.
The ideas contained in the proposal were presented in a paper, titled “The New
Community as an Application of Community,” given by Paulson and Harpole at the
November 1970 national meeting of the Adult Education Association. With further
discussion between the CCLD and local Title I Administrator Dave Steward the funds
were allocated in 1971 to begin the development of a blueprint aimed towards the
implementation of a community based revitalization plan.30
With funds in hand a Policy Committee was formed with Harpole as the Project
Director and a committee was established to recruit a Planner for the project. Carole
Watson, the wife of Donald T. Watson the assistant program director of Cream City
Neighborhood Health Center, was selected as the projects Planner. Watson, with a
29
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background in social work, was committed to developing a program for involving
community members in the planning process. She worked to reach out to community
members and businesses to get their support for the HRP.31
In an interview with the Milwaukee Sentinel in January 1972 Watson laid out her
ambitious vision for the project, stating, “The project proposes to align professional
persons from the universities with community residents in a working group which will
create a comprehensive plan to include not only housing and economic development
recreation and social services. Among the questions facing this group will be how to
combat crime, develop an industrial base, encourage prospective employers, supply more
transportation, provide local services- in short, rebuild a good community life.”32 Watson
and others were seeking to develop an all-encompassing plan which would economically
revitalize the neighborhood that would include input from the current residents as well as
experts which would not result in the destruction and displacement of residents which
had been the hallmark of urban renewal up to that point.
Despite her vision and optimism of redeveloping community involvement Watson
resigned out of frustration in June 1972. Community planning assistants that were
supposed to engage in community outreach to assist Watson failed to do their jobs.
During her tenure she was able to establish the Green Bay Action Year Program, which
provided four students to work as aides and later teachers at the Harambee Community
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School. She also established several task forces which engaged with union officials to
increase visibility of the project.33
In Watson’s place the Policy Committee chose two men Leon Todd and Bill
Delany who worked against the idea of complete community control of the planning
process. In their report to the HRP directors they expressed frustration with inheriting a
plan which was “fragmented and not very functional.”34 They dedicated a whole section
to their views on the complexities of citizen participation in the development of urban
renewal plans. They felt that for any plan to be successful it must include the input of
outside experts such as themselves who spoke the “technical language of finance” and
could develop an “analytical frame work acceptable to city planners.”35 Their report
expressed real tensions within the HRP over what exactly counted as community control
and citizen participation. They stressed that a neighborhood redevelopment project could
not succeed unless it connected with the connected with the interests of outside housing
developers and other financial interests in the city.
Under Delany and Todd’s guidance a blueprint was completed and the decision
was made to incorporate a Community Development Corporation to implement their
plans.36 The Community Development Corporation would serve as the umbrella
organization for a whole host of programs, including the Harambee Ombudsman Project
and the Harambee Development Corporation, designed to tackle the social and economic
problems faced by a growing number of residents in the Harambee neighborhood.
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Revitalization in Action
The HRP was officially incorporated as a CDC with the state on June 25th, 1973.
Harpole took on the title of Project Director for the HRP. Deploying the language of
Black Power and self-determination to frame the importance of the project Harpole
explained, “We must lead the way for our children as well as for ourselves in shaking off
the last of the chains of slavery. We must begin to determine for ourselves, what is going
to happen in our neighborhood and our community, rather than having those kinds of
decisions being made by outsiders. The latter way is called colonization, and the first
democracy.”37 The goal was to create a program that would benefit all African
American’s in the neighborhood and with African American’s in control of every step of
the process.
The first concrete step the HRP took towards revitalizing the neighborhood was
the sponsorship of a “Maxwell Street Day” event on October 7th, 1973. The HRP hoped
that this event would draw attention to businesses along the Green Bay Ave/North 3rd
Street corridor which ran through the neighborhood. As well an Information Resource
Center was established at the Martin Luther King Library by the School of Library
Science at UWM.38
With a goal of economic revitalization and the development of an independent
black community the HRP established a series of projects which would attack the
Harambee Revitalization Project, Inc., Box 2, Folder 45, “Harambee Revitalization Project,
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problems plaguing residents and hopefully develop a strong leadership. At the same time
programs were also established to reach out to the city and state to increase resident’s
access to social services and health programs. While espousing self-determination and
Black Power the leaders of the project knew they would need help from outside
governmental entities if they were going to adequately address the problems of
unemployment, poverty, and the health problems that accompany adverse social
conditions. The leadership hoped that appeals to a collective black identity would
mobilize residents of Harambee around the redevelopment project while also realizing
that the resources for revitalization and levers of power rested outside the boundaries of
the neighborhood in the hands of a largely white political and economic system.
The HRP established the Harambee Ombudsman Project as a means of
identifying and resolving community problems. The Ombudsman worked to connect
families with public and private services which might ameliorate their issues. Two
Ombudsmen were tasked with going door to door surveying neighborhood residents with
brief surveys. Some of the problems which they attempted to address included rat
infestations, garbage collection, home repair, street maintenance, street lighting and
improving recreational facilities throughout the neighborhood. The Ombudsman project
also established a block watch program to develop community leaders who could bring
issues to the attention of the HRP.39 The Ombudsman project produced a monthly
newsletter, “Harambee Speaks,” in an attempt to inform neighborhood residents on what
sort of progress was being achieved in the area.
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As rates of unemployment and poverty rose in Harambee deteriorating housing
stock became a major problem. The Harambee Development Corporation (HDC) was
created under the aegis of the HRP to provide home repair services and encourage
residents to fix up their own homes. The desired result was to educate residents in how to
maintain their homes and to provide them with repair loans so they could make
appropriate repairs and upkeep.40
Deteriorating health conditions in the neighborhood also followed increasing rates
of poverty and unemployment. The Harambee Health Project was an attempt to develop a
neighborhood based health program to provide health screenings, medical screenings,
education in preventive care, and limited primary care. This program had input from the
Harambee Health Committee, the Medical College of Wisconsin, the City Health
Commissioner, Milwaukee County’s Downtown medical Center, and the UW-Extension.

Harambee at a Crossroads
Despite their best intentions all was not well with the HRP at the end of the
1970s. A project that began with the utmost optimism and determination in the early
1970s found its self in a state of crisis at the close of the decade. The HDC was on the
verge of collapse by the spring of 1978. The Milwaukee Sentinel published a highly
critical piece on March 3rd 1978 which chronicled the HDC’s fiscal woes ahead of a
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decision by the Community Development Policy Committee as to whether the city would
continue to fund the troubled neighborhood redevelopment program.41
The Milwaukee Sentinel reported that the HDC was beset with poor bookkeeping,
bad checks, overdue bills, and unpaid income withholding taxes. Milwaukee’s
Community Development Agency (CDA), the organization tasked with distributed
federal redevelopment funds, had given HDC $48,100 in administrative funds. A funding
agreement had been signed between the city and HDC in June 1977. In November 1977 a
city comptroller review found that HDC had not paid $15,824 in FICA and state and
federal withholding taxes. Checks written in September and October of 1977 had been
returned due to insufficient funds. The comptrollers review concluded “The internal
control over cash appears to be extremely poor.”42
The HDC failed to meet the promises it made to the CDA. It had presented a plan
to provide repair services to 501 homes in 1977, but by November of that year had only
conducted 101 “home repair interviews” and 29 “small service repairs.” Kenneth L.
Anderson, president of the HDC board and a crane operator, was quoted as saying that
the program was a “sloppy mess.” He told the paper that former staff failed to collect on
bills owed to the HDC and overlooked the theft of funds. The executive director of the
program had resigned in January of that year.
When the HDC had first applied to the city for funding from the CDA in 1976 it
had listed $139,000 in potential funds from outside sources. According to board
“Money Woes Plague Program,” Milwaukee Sentinel, March 3, 1978.
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president Anderson some of these funds failed to materialize, contributing to the short
fall. His explanation for the shortfall was that “our staff didn’t hack it, didn’t manage,”
and that his staff failed to stop stealing of HDC funds and didn’t collect on overdue
bills.43
The HDC appealed to the city to utilize $27,000 in unspent CDA funds to pay for
supplies, vehicle maintenance, and to pay the salary of a consultant up to $1,200 a month
to sort out the corporations fiscal woes. CDA director Wallace Burkee, indicated that he
didn’t want the funds to be spent on anything other than their original intended purpose,
which was providing limited home maintenance, small loans, counseling, repair
estimates, and referral services. Due to the alleged mismanagement of funds the city left
the HDC out of its 1978 request for federal funding for community development.
After reviewing the fiscal situation of the HDC the CDA’s Community
Development Policy Committee voted to alter guidelines on $29,700 earmarked for the
program to see if it could be revived. The new guidelines would allow the HDC to hire a
consultant to reorganize staff, pay for truck repair and maintenance, offices supplies, and
utilities. Eunice Lockhart-Moss, the president of consulting firm E. Inc., was hired to
oversee the reorganization of the HDC. Newly hired consultant Lockhart-Moss reported
that the HDC had a total debt exceeding $25,000, but due to restrictions set by the
Community Development Policy Committee none of the newly released funds could be
used to pay it down. This debt included $13,629 in state and federal withholding taxes,
$9,464 owed to contractors and building material suppliers, and $2,300 in legal fees.
CDA director Burkee told the paper that while a city audit of the HDC had uncovered
43
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“very, very inept management,” it had not uncovered any fraud or theft by staff members.
The CDA gave provisional support for future funding depending on a review of the new
management team less than two months later on May 31st.44
Emile A. Jarreau, of the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission,
was brought in to serve as the program’s interim director. Jarreau had previously served
as the head of the Northside Citizens Neighborhood Conservation Corporation, a
redevelopment organization which had purchased 300 housing units and resold them to
low and moderate income families on Milwaukee’s north side.
Belden Paulson, now chairman of the UW Extension’s Center for Urban
Community Development (CUCD) spoke out in defense of the HDC which had been
under the sponsorships of the CUCD until January of 1977 when it broke off to seek
more federal community development funds. Rather than focusing on the gross
mismanagement of funds Paulsen called on the CDA to help make the Harambee project
work. Paulsen stated that the HDC program had identified “a no man’s land” in the
neighborhood where homeowners had income too high to qualify for rehabilitation
programs, but not high enough to qualify for conventional city redevelopment loans. This
area, Paulson felt, deserved concerted attention from the CDA which the work of the
HDC would potentially provide if it was allowed to reorganize and get back on track.45
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Conclusion
Even with perfect book keeping and the highest of fiduciary skills the Harambee
project would still have run into trouble finding committed public funding to maintain
and expand their operations. After the initial funding through the Title I of the Higher
Education Act the HRP had to turn to the city of Milwaukee’s CDA which distributed
federal grant money for neighborhood revitalization to keep its projects afloat. In 1974
the Community Development Block Grant program was establish to consolidate federal
redevelopment programs and distribute federal funds to local redevelopment agencies
which would then distribute those funds to community organizations.
According to Professor Michael Bonds in Race, Politics, and Community
Development Funding this degree of local control over the distribution of development
grants, particularly in Milwaukee, gave rise to a disparity in funding for projects in
African American neighborhoods. Funds intended to reach impoverished African
American neighborhoods were funneled to benefit whites, and black organizations were
more likely to lose their funding. This bias in funding made it much more difficult for
any African American development organization to even stay afloat.46
Despite the efforts of the HRP and its various projects the social and economic
deterioration of the Harambee neighborhood would continue at an even quicker pace in
the 1980s, 1990s and up to the present day. Manufacturing employment continued to
decline at a rapid rate. Rates of poverty and unemployment rose precipitously for African
Americans. Concentrations of extreme poverty increased. At the HRP a majority of
46
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everyone’s time was spent in planning the development of plans to be implemented at
some point in the future. Progress from the Harambee Revitalization Project was
extremely slow and the program became beset by problems, not the least of which was
receiving adequate funding.
On top of this globalization continued to wreak havoc on working class
communities in Milwaukee and throughout the United States. There was little that an
organization which attempted to achieve change on the neighborhood level could do to
counter these changes. Working people and especially those who found themselves in
poverty benefited little from the flows of federal money and the initiatives of community
organizations. There was little that could be done to create good paying jobs which would
ameliorate the neighborhoods decline. Those who ultimately benefitted were those people
such as Reuben Harpole who spearheaded these initiatives and went on to bigger and
better things.
Additionally the federal government’s decision to switch its funding model for
urban renewal projects to the Community Development Block Grant model which while
simplifying the process for applying and receiving federal redevelopment grants it
represented the beginning of a decline in the federal government’s commitment to
supporting social programs and was beset by problems of racial bias as the decision for
distribution of funds was placed in the hands of local officials who funneled funds to
friends and political allies.
Although the HRP failed to revitalize the Harambee neighborhood, or even to
stem the tide of rising of poverty and unemployment it represents a significant
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development in social activism by African Americans in the city of Milwaukee. The
creation of the HRP marked the convergence of the Civil Rights activism of the 1960s,
developing notions concerning Black Power and self-determination, and an influx of
federal funding for community based redevelopment programs made possible by
President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society initiatives. These trends that emerged from
social upheavals in the 1960s came together in the 1970s through Harambee as a creative
and ambitious but ultimately failed attempt to create a vibrant and self-sufficient African
American community in the city of Milwaukee.
Black Power and Pan-Africanism emerged as a defining theme for many social
activists, though this appearance of radicalism often served as a cover for more
conventional politics and often failed to rally African Americans in the way that some
thought it might. The experience of the HRP also illustrates quite clearly the difficulties
involved in achieving significant and lasting social change, especially at the
neighborhood level, in the face of a highly integrated global economy.

Conclusion
This thesis has examined the impact of urban renewal projects on the
development of Milwaukee’s African American community with particular focus on the
1960s and 1970s. City planners and politicians thought that by undertaking urban renewal
projects they could rejuvenate the economies of industrial cities which began to decline
in the face of suburbanization and globalization. Understanding the implementation and
impact of urban renewal is vital to understanding the development of Milwaukee’s
African American community and the development of black civic involvement. The
city’s black population was quite small when urban renewal projects began disrupting a
community which had only just begun to put down roots in the immediate post-World
War II period.
Initially urban renewal consisted of destructive projects referred to as slum
clearance which cleared out African American neighborhoods and pushed working class
blacks and whites away from soon to be thriving downtown business districts. Urban
renewal projects played an important role in shaping and influencing the development of
Milwaukee’s African American community. Massive projects such as the construction of
the interstate highway system were disruptive moments whose legacy continues to be felt
in black communities throughout the United States.
These projects were being carried out and implemented at the very moment that
the Civil Rights movement was beginning to make gains in the fight against racial
segregation and discrimination. The effort to revitalize the Harambee neighborhood in the
1960s and 1970s represents an extension of Civil Rights ideology activism into the field
of urban renewal. Black agency was instrumental in shaping urban renewal projects in the
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city of Milwaukee and changing the focus from neighborhood destruction to African
American led neighborhood preservation. Despite the best efforts of those who engaged
in the process of urban renewal the outcomes have been mixed and social conditions for
many African Americans have stagnated or gotten worse in the decades since the heyday
of urban renewal. The promise of economic revitalization on which urban renewal was
sold proved illusory for most as globalization sunk its teeth further into Milwaukee’s
industrial base.

